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(i) 
ABSTRACT 
An investigation of the various interpretations given by Whitehead 
to the concepts religious, education, duty, and reverence; and especially 
of the problems which arise when they are taken in association, as in 
the title-statements. 
The philosophical implications of his views on religion (which 
cannot be dissociated from his description of that which is religious), 
and the bearing they have not only on education generally, but also 
on religious education, is examined. Ancillary to this has been a brief 
scrutiny of forms of knowledge, methods of learning, truth-claims, and 
the nature of belief. 
This has led to an examination of the nature and role both of 
certainty and uncertainty; and, on the authority of Whitehead and others, 
a claim has been made that the latter element has a legitimate place in 
the activity or process of education. 
Whitehead's dissatisfaction with the positivistic standpoint is 
shown in his advocacy of a type of philosophy which was, for some long 
time, foreign to most educational theorising; but which appears now to 
be regaining vitality and support. 
The concepts of purpose and teleology are referred to as being 
necessarily integral to an education which is religious in essence. 
Similarly, the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity, of the social 
and the individual, are woven through the whole dissertation. Whitehead's 
suggestion that conventional religion is losing its authority as it loses 
its objectivity is examined, and it is suggested that his relativism 
(which manifests itself as 'process') is seen both as contributing to 
this, and perhaps as leading to a new understanding of the meaning of 
religion. 
In conclusion, reference is made to special problems which Whitehead's 
point of view might provide for those who are most directly concerned in 
the enterprise of education. 
(ii) 
PREFACE 
Before undertaking the analysis which is the purpose of this 
Dissertation, I shall comment on an incipient conceptual confusion. 
In the two title statements Whitehead uses the word 'religious'. 
'Religion' is its cognate; but might there not be, in fact, a dist-
inction between the two concepts of such significance that reference 
to 'religion' should be avoided? In other words, by mentioning rel-
igion do we not move into quite a different region? One which is 
indeed, not strictly germane to our topic? 
John Dewey in his A Common Faith (Yale U.P., 1934) wrote "It is 
widely supposed that a person who does not accept any religion is 
thereby shown to be a non-religious person .•.• I believe that many 
persons are so repelled from what exists as a religion by its intell-
ectual and moral implications, that they are not even aware of attitu-
des in themselves that if they came to fruition would be genuinely rel-
igious. I hope this remark may·help to make clear what I mean by the 
distinction between 'religion' as a noun substantive .and 'religious' as 
adjectival". This last sentence illustrates the difficulty to which I 
refer. 
This can hardly be seen as other than a disparagement of 'religion'. 
Does it entail, at the same time, a disparagement of the notion of 
'religious'? Dewey might have thought not; but in that case he would 
have put a meaning of his own on the latter word, different from general 
usage. 
Whitehead is similarly critical of some of the manifestations of 
religion; but he does not go so far, I feel, as Dewey went when he said 
"Yet if is conceivable that the present depression in religion is 
closely connected with the fact that religions now prevent, because of 
their weight of'historical encumbrances, the religious quality of 
experience from coming to consciousness, and finding the expression 
that is appropriate to present conditions, intellectual and moral". 
This is too general an assertion to be.of much value. Whitehead was 
more specific because, unlike Dewey, he did not regard all knowledge 
as being basically scientific in character. For this reason he was 
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able to make provision for religion as a 'form of knowledge'; and he 
saw in religion certain recognisable attributes. 
Thus, in Religion in the Making (C.U.P., 1927) he tells us that, 
in the external expression of religion in human history, ritual, emotion, 
belief, and rationalization are marked features. Furthermore he speaks 
of concepts peculiar to religion, which come in moments of insight; and 
he therefore describes religion as 'one among other specialized interests 
of mankind whose truths are of limited validity'. This conceptualizes 
a distinctive kind of awareness, the reality of which Dewey would not 
have accepted. Even less would he have agreed with Whitehead's state-
ment that 'on its other side religion claims that its concepts, though 
derived primarily from special experiences, are yet of universal valid-
ity, to be applied by faith to the ordering of all experience. (my emphasis) 
If he is right in this - and I believe he is - he has here closed 
that gap between religion as a noun substantive and religious as adject-
ival. 
Religion, then, must somehow enter into Whitehead's 'essence of 
education'; though clearly he was not addressing himself to the consid-
eration of religious education as such. In the popular mind, and in 
many educational circles, there is much misunderstanding on this score. 
I have, however, allowed myself to discuss aspects of 'religious educa-
tion' when the argument seemed to lead to it; because if Whitehead's 
stated criteria are legitimate, they apply to this subject as much as 
to any other. Religious education is indeed a brick in the edifice 
which is religion. 
Whitehead himself frequently brought religious and religion into 
close association, as this extract from Religion in the Making shows. 
The importance of rational religion in the history 
of modern culture is that it stands or falls with 
its fundamental position, that we know more than 
can be formulated in one finite systematized scheme 
of abstractions, however important that scheme may 
be in the elucidation of some aspects of the order 
of things .•.• Religion insists that the world is a 
mutually adjusted disposition of things, issuing 
in value for its own sake. This is the very point 
e 
(iv) 
that science is always forgetting. Religions commit 
suicide when they find their inspirations in their 
dogmas .•• but dogmatic expression is necessary. For 
whatever has objective va~idity is capable of part-
ial expression in terms of abstract concepts, so that 
a coherent doctrine arises which elucidates the world 
beyond the locus of the origin of the dogmas in quest-
ion .•. The religious spirit is not identical with 
dialectical acuteness". 
When we speak of religion we must certainly include Christianity; 
and Christianity is peculiar because of its claim to know 'saving 
truth' by revelation. In addition to revealed religion there is natural 
religion. Thus a particular kind of epistemology has developed out of 
Christianity; and so has a special relationship between it, philosophy, 
and education. Dewey's opinion deserves respect: but I do not see how 
we can make a clean separation between 'religion' and 'religious' (as 
he would have favoured) in such a way that we could interpret "The 
essence of education is that it be religious", quite independently of 
religion! 
If it appears that this is to make a logical mountain out of a 7 
semantic molehill, let it be recognised that in any study of religion 
we must employ certain concepts or hypotheses (e.g. sin, redemption) 
in unique fashion because they belong to a unique form of discourse. 
Other concepts (e.g. free-will, creation, after-life), although they 
have a religious meaning, have other distinct interpretations when 
they are employed in the discourse proper to, say, psychology or 
philosophy. Even those religious concepts which can be transferred 
from one category of discourse to another (by way of analogy or meta-
phor) must be described as being at least of the substance of religion. 
So religion seems to have a logical priority from which the knowledge 
of that which is religious might be derived. 
When we ad4 the word 'religious' to 'education' or 'psychology' 
for example, we produce a conceptual hybrid; and this is bound to lead 
to ambiguity. Whitehead's statements in the earlier part of this preface 
suggest a reason why it is hardly possible to apply sufficient rigour to 
enable us to avoid this ambiguity. 
The use of the word 'religious', then, in the two statements which 
(v) 
I shall submit to critical analysis implies, 
(a) that all the kinds of things mentioned about religion must be kept 
in mind •••• in substance if not in detail; and 
(b) that some equivocation will certainly appear. Consider, for example, 
the difference (which is not merely semantic) between 'sociology of rel-
igion' and 'religious sociology'. 'Education that is religious' (in 
Whitehead's sense) is not the same as 'religious education'. Yet, at 
the conceptual level, the two cannot be separated completely any more 
than 'religious' and 'religion' can be separated completely. 
Although it is not possible to give any one comprehensive and 
satisfying definition of religion, it is, without question, an entity 
(as Whitehead recognised when he named its attributes) from which the 
religious is derivative - even though man was being religious long before 
he knew what religion was! 
So the concept 'religious' will have to carry a wide meaning, with; 
overtones which transcend the purely adjectival. With J.P. White we 
might see it as meaning something like 'the understanding of ends them-
selves' when we use it in association with 'education', hybrid though 
it be. And that form of words would not be entirely inappropriate as 
one aspect towards a definition of 'religion'. 
SECTION ONE 
Introduction 
"The aim of education is to dispel error and discover truth" -:-
Socrates 
"The true aim of education is the attainment of happiness through 
perfect virtue" - Aristotle 
For the concepts 
may readily be found, 
d · d l' · d f' · h · · 1 7 ? e ucation an re igion, e ~ing c aracter1st1cs , " 
even though their definition is impossible. In this 
.___~-- -· 
critical analysis of two of Whitehead's statements I have selected from 
his writings illustrations of a sort to produce an argument which is as 
consistent, and a pattern which is as intelligible, as might be expected 
concerning concepts which (like that of virtue, in the quotation from 
Aristotle, above) are of an ambiguous character. 
Whitehead's assertions that 'religion is what a man does with his own 
solitariness', and that 'the essence of education is that it be religious' 
provide an illustration of the inherent difficulty. For though it might be 
possible to conceive of a 'solitary religion', it is hardly possible to 
contemplate an education that was solitary. The dilemma is, however, more 
apparent than real. It is characteristic of the method of presenting ideas 
for examination adopted not only by Whitehead, but also by William James 
and Bergson. Although it was not Whitehead's custom to be paradoxical in 
his attempts to express what he believed to be 'the truth' (unlike some 
recent theologians whose writings have had considerable effect on our 
theological understanding of 'religion') a similar apparent equivocation 
appears in his use of 'meaning'. In places he intends it to denote value; 
and, in others, interpretation. The context generally makes clear which 
usage is intended. 
The two statements which I shall submit to critical analysis come at 
the end of the first chapter of Whitehead's The Aims of Education and other 
Essays. Although one sentence follows the other immediately, the first 
('the essence of education is that it be religious') is an assertion, or a 
statement of belief .... a manifesto, almost: and the second ('a religious 
education is an education which inculcates duty and reverence') seems to 
hint at a methodology. For, as Whitehead says in that Essay, duty requires 
that we attain knowledge of what is relevant to decision and action, and 
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reverence is that which is inseparably conjoinea with qenerality of outlook. 
There will be cause to refer to this 'overlapping' elsewhere in this 
work; but I merely remark at this stage that it will be necessary to examine 
the two statements separately, as well as to analyse the two concepts (of 
religion and education) along this double course. I intend in this way to 
elucidate what meaning Whitehead gives to the concepts of education and 
religion. 
Belief is certainly an aspect of religion; and so even is methodology. 
Methodology is certainly an aspect of education; but so is belief •••• if 
that word is to include theories and philosophies of education. Whitehead's 
two sentences are definite enough to suggest that they formulate his own 
philosophy of education. Yet to find out what he meant in what are, in 
fact, two splendidly inconclusive assertions, it will be necessary, because 
his comments about the nature, and the scope, and the purpose both of 
religion and education are scattered so widely throughout his writings, to 
survey a large area of his recorded thought. 
Following the example of discursiveness given by him I have incorpora-
ted at sundry points in this work glimpses of Whitehead the man; for it is 
unlikely that we shall come to a reasonable understanding of his teaching 
unless we keep in mind who was the teacher. And this in spite of the advice 
of Thomas Aquinas, who, in a letter to a Brother John on 'How to Study', 
wrote Non respicias a quo sed sane dicatur memoriae recommenda! 
Although Whitehead did not write formally on education he was an educationist; 
although he did not write formally on moral philosophy he was a moralist; 
and although he did not write formally on religion(l), his religious thinking 
pervades the whole corpus of his literary work. Indeed, to discover his 
'complete' thought about any matter (and not least about education) requires 
a familiarity with that literary corpus. (2) 
It will be difficult to keep in the forefront the educational aspect of 
the subject, and to avoid entering into the deeps of Whitehead's religious 
philosophy. It could be asked, indeed, whether it were possible to comprehend 
what he meant by 'religious education' without exploring these more profound 
areas of his thought. I can but plead, in mitigation, the need to be 
selective within the prescribed compass of this dissertation. 
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There is a two-fold value in studying Whitehead just now. At the 
simpler level he was what the man-in-the-street (if he had known him!) 
would describe as an optimist. He was a man who, in living life to the 
full, manifestly enjoyed doing so. The sort of upbringing he was able to 
enjoy, and the period of history in which he spent his youth in Britain, 
combined to preserve him from the effects of an angst which is so typical 
of later generations exposed to existential speculations and doomsday 
realities. 
Second, and at a deeper level, what he said about intuition is of 
prime importance. Much will be said by way of explanation of that state-
ment as I develop my theme. (3.50) But here and now it might be said of 
the philosophy which is peculiar to Whitehead that it provides a common 
stratum to those scientific methodologies which allow a place for intuition. 
He went so far sometimes in his claim for intuition that even his friends 
had to criticise him. P.A. Schilpp, for example,(4.611) regretted 
Whitehead's statement that 'our intuitions of righteousness disclose an 
absoluteness in the nature of things, and so does the taste 0£ a lump of 
sugar.'(5.165) Whitehead had been describing intuitions as absolute; but 
in this quotation the emphasis is probably on the absoluteness of right-
eousness rather than on that of intuition. 
It was this sensitivity towards intuition which led him to rebuke 
the hard-headed positivists(3.164) who heaped scorn upon the mystic, the 
artist, or the romantic poet. Mary B. Hesse reminds us that Whitehead 
contrasts two modes of perception ••. one part of our 
experience is handy and definite in our consciousness; 
also it is easy to reproduce it at will. The other 
type of experience, however insistent, is vague, 
haunting, unmanageable •.• "Sense-data are emphatically 
the manageable elements in our perceptions of the world. 
The sense of controlling presences has the contrary 
character; it is unmanageable, vague, ·and ill-defined. 
But for all their vagueness •.• these .•• are what we want 
to know about". I have given this extract at length 
because it indicates better than any paraphrase could 
indicate the boldness with which Whitehead comes back 
to our solid cornrnonsense certainties, and tries to 
describe them honestly and without any concession to 
fashionable modes of philosophical expression. (6.115/6) 
I give another glimpse of 'Whitehead the man' in the Notes to this Section(?) 
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but here I must emphasise that Whitehead's optimism was neither fatuous 
nor unrealistic. He was not of the inevitable, or evolutionary, per-
fectionist school. Nor was he guilty of a theological liberalism of 
the grosser sort such as we find, for example, in H.G. Wells' God the 
Invisible King. (Though both agreed, remarkably enough, in thinking of 
God as saviour). Whitehead's optimism was a statement of faith about what 
could be rather than about what is. He found the focus of his optimism 
in 'the adventure of religion'. Though, as we shall see, he gave his own 
interpretation to this concept. This would not be inconsistent with 
Einstein's claim.to belong 'to the ranks of devoutly religious men' through 
finding the meaning of religion in his quest to know the real world. For, 
as Einstein said, 'To know what is really impenetrable to us really exists, 
manifesting itself as the highest wisdom and the most radical beauty which 
our dull faculties can comprehend only in their most primitive form ••• 
this knowledge, this feeling, is at the centre of true religiousness'. (8.24) 
John Macquarrie tells us that Einstein believed in a cosmic religion •• 
which was, a faith that the world was ordered rationally, and was comprehens-
ible in that sense. But this cosmic religion was also an important component 
in that inspiration which is a feature of the creative power of the scientist. 
'We invent from our own minds notions of mathematical elegance, we submit 
them to the test of experience, and they turn out to be true'. (9.244) 
This sense of order and consistency is, as Weizsacker pointed out, 
an essential development from the Hebrew doctrine of ethical monotheism 
which has coloured the whole of our Western culture, and especially its 
sciences. (10.106 and 120) An interesting point is that for Einstein, as 
for Spinoza, God was non-personal; and Whitehead shows a similar bias in 
interpretation ('bias' being here entirely non-pejorative). (It is for this 
reason that I have included this excursion on Einstein) • 
But there is another significant connection between Whitehead and 
Einstein which arises from the latter's concept of relativity. If, as he 
asserted, there are no absolutes in the physical world, is there any very 
good reason for us to believe in absolutes in any area? Whitehead, for 
one, would have insisted that there was. 
One feels that he could have associated himself also with an opinion 
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expressed by the biologist, Joseph Needham (and the fact that a biological 
scientist as well as a physical scientist should comment on the nature of 
religion is not without significance). Needham maintains that 'religion 
is no more and no less than the reaction of the human spirit to the facts 
of human destiny and the forces by which it is influenced; and natural 
piety, or a divination of sacredness in heroic goodness becomes the primary 
religious activity'. (8.24) Whitehead comments on this indirectly, as 
we shall see, in what he has to say about duty and reverence. But it is 
worth noting here how the scientist has admitted concepts of value into 
his reckoning. 
To anyone who asked "But what is religious education all about, and 
within what categories does it operate, and by what_ criteria is it to be 
judged?" those statements of Einstein and Needham could be offered as 
contributions towards an answer .•• an answer which will be fleshed-out 
by Whitehead. The title-sentences of this dissertation are a summary of 
the answer Whitehead gave. Though so very brief they are, in fact, a 
synoptic view of life itself! 
I intend, in the course of this work, to explicate that assertion; 
and, if justification for the line I shall take were required, I would 
refer to Professor A. Boyce Gibson who, in his Essay on page 40 of 
Melbourne Studies in Education 1965, wrote 
There was never a time when the capacity to see things 
as a whole was more important, and there neve~ was a 
time when philosophers were less concerned about it. 
It is a solace to turn back to Whitehead and to trace 
the guiding lines of his thought as it swings before 
the metaphysics of creativity and eternal objects, and 
an educational programme advancing from creative novelty 
through precision and discipline to constructive 
generalisation. 
In spite of his devotion to the Platonic form of philosophy Whitehead 
belonged to the realist rather than to the idealist family of metaphysicians .. 
a family which lives on in America. In England it has (or had) been ousted 
by a generally anti-metaphysical way of thinking. The significant thing 
about the new realism is that it, like the new Thomism, has considerable 
bearing on the matter of religion. The emphasis on speculation, which is 
so marked a feature in Whitehead's philosophy, is a reaction against those 
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·forms of philosophy and religion in which idealism is completely rejected. 
His disinclination towards positivism and linguistic analysis is symptomatic 
of his desire to produce a constructive philosophy which would revive con-
cepts of wholeness or unity. 
It is useful to remind ourselves now and then that there are these 
different families in philosophy, and that not all have succumbed to the 
blandishments of empiricism or positivism. In his introduction to Process 
and Reality Whitehead observes that his philosophy represents to some 
extent 'a transformation of some main doctrines of absolute idealism on to 
a realistic basis'. One of the marks of this transformation is the bringing 
of God into time, and involving Him in the 'world process'. 
When Whitehead speaks of religion in his typical fashion he can hardly 
be referring to the typical transcendental concepts of the divinity which are 
held in the popular interpretation and understanding. It was because his 
philosophy was of a non-materialistic kind, even though it was compatible 
with the natural sciences, that its expression in religious terms was 
virtually inevitable. It comes as no surprise, then, to find him speaking 
of 'the religious vision' as 'our one ground for optimism'; thus revealing 
the source of his own dynamism and his basic idealism,as well as his dis-
enchantment with scientific humanism. 
At the same time Whitehead rejected a dualistic explanation of the 
universe. (11) He strove, as mentioned above, to find a unitary or 
unifying explanation of.things; and this it was which led him to the more 
theological outlook of his later writings. He found his basic explanation 
in God .••• but he saw God as an 'entity' related to other entities. God 
was not, that is to say, non-contingent. To this relationship Whitehead 
gives the name prehension; and he describes all entities as being bipolar, 
or mental and physical. (12) Just how this differs from dualism of the 
Cartesian sort is not easy to see; and one can sympathise with Schilpp 
when he says (albeit in another context) "So far as the present writer 
has been able to make out, Mr. Whitehead offers no specific answer to 
this question whatsoever". 
We shall have cause to mention, in more than one place, a similar 
criticism. Whitehead's writing suffers, as Professor Joad used to say, 
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from two kinds of obscurity •••. that of subject matter, and that of 
expression. In short, Whitehead often failed to be as clear as he should 
have been! 
A quotation from Aristotle might make a fitting conclusion to this 
section. 'It is the duty of an educated man to aim at accuracy in each 
separate case only as far as the nature of the subject allows it: to 
demand logical demonstration from an orator, for example, would be as 
absurd as to allow a mathematician to use the arts of persuasion'. One 
can imagine Whitehead's offering that as an answer to the criticisms by 
Professors Schilpp and Joad. 
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Notes to Section One 
1. Except perhaps his Religion in the Making. 
2. Edgar French might have had Whitehead in mind when, in his preface 
to Melbourne Studies in Education 1965 he wrote 
There was a time when educated men wrote on education, 
as they wrote on moral philosophy, political economy, 
history or literature; that is, with the ease and 
naturalness that comes from knowing that a subject 
falls within the bounds of one's competence and 
obligation as a learned man ••• That scholars in the 
liberal arts and sciences have often been discouraged 
from expressing their ideas on education is unfortunately 
true. Fearing that they may not be in command of all the 
facts, or unsure of the relevance of their particular 
discipline for educational studies, they have hesitated 
to write. But in spite of the discouragements, the 
tradition by which educational studies exist in easy and 
natural association with arts and letters lives on. 
Though as Whitehead was a polymath it would hardly be possible to 
say what his discipline was - and he did not seem to be afflicted 
by the diffidence of which French speaks! 
3. Ritchie, A.D. Civilization, Science and Religion, Pelican, 1945. 
This means that we now have three kinds of entities on our hands. 
(1) There are the strictly non-temporal truths (or universals or 
concepts if these terms are preferred). (2) Within the temporal 
realm there are those, if they can be found, which endure through 
time and constitute a backbone of permanent reality. (3) Lastly, 
there are changing events with which we are acquainted through 
sense-experience. The permanencies (2) may or may not be such 
that we can be directly acquainted with them in sense-experience. 
The erudite reader will have noticed that what I have just said 
is derived from contemporary philosophical piscussion, mainly from 
Whitehead, but it is directed towards bringing out certain points 
made by Plato •••. Only rarely is the correct answer found except 
by going through the wrong ones ••• The practice of this method is 
what Plato meant by Dialectic. 
4. Schillp, P.A. (editor), The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, 
The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. III, Northwestern University, 
1941. 
-9-
5. Whitehead, A.N., Modes of Thought. Emphasis in the original. 
6. Hesse, M.B., Science and the Human Imagination, S.C.M. Press, 1954. 
7. Burns, E. McN. and Ralph, P.L., World Civilizations, Vol. 2, 
2nd Edition, W.W. Norton and Company Incorporated, 1958. 
A liberal in politics and in social theory, Whitehead had a 
firm belief in the certainty of progress. He had an abiding 
faith also in a benevolent God. But he refused to think of 
this God as a divine autocrat handing down tables of law, and 
punishing men eternally for trespassing against them. Instead, 
he conceived him as a God of love, as 'the poet of the world, 
with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, 
and goodness'. (from Process and Reality). The defect of most 
religions, Christianity included, has been to represent God as 
a God of power. God is not omnipotent, or else he would be the 
author of evil. His primary function is to save human beings 
from the evil which necessarily arises in connection with their 
struggle for the good. Such was Whitehead's conception of a 
friendly universe in which God and man are partners in striving 
towards perfection. p.671. 
8. Magee, J.B., Religion and Modern Man, Harper and Row, 1967. 
9. Macquarrie, J., Twentieth Century Religious Thought, S.C.M., 1967. 
10. Weizs~cker, C.F. van, The Relevance of Science, Collins, 1964. 
11. Cartesian dualism led to theological developments which Whitehead 
was unable to accept. The Cartesian distinction between mind and 
matter is but one example of what Whitehead called bifurcation. 
Other examples are those between substance and quality, thing and 
environment, and science and aesthetics. He tackled the problem of 
dualism with his doctrine of prehension. Life and matter are like 
two threads, interwoven in the pattern of process. Distinction 
between these threads will be drawn by commonsense and by scientific 
thought; but, in reality, they are not separable. 
12. Whitehead's doctrine of prehension is really a developed form of 
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Hegel's doctrine of internal relations; but differentiated from it 
by the thought of an active taking-into-relation as against a passive 
being-in-relation. In this sense it is positive. It may also take 
a negative form, by exclusion. 
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SECTION TWO 
Religious and Educational Value-systems 
"Religion, whatever it is, is a man's total reaction upon life ..• 
Total reactions are different from casual reactions, and total attitudes 
are different from usual or professional attitudes" - William James. 
In his Science and the Modern World Whitehead faces the explicit 
question 'What is religion?'; and, in answering it, he is really making 
a statement about what he calls 'the essential character of the religious 
spirit' .•. and that might not be at all the same thing. 
'Religion' he writes 'is the vision of something which stands beyond, 
behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things: something which 
is real and yet waiting to be realised; something which is a remote 
possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts; something which gives 
meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose 
possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something 
which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest'. (1.238) 
A vision, an unrealised ideal, a hopeless quest? One must confess, 
somewhat ruefully, that it is not difficult to appreciate why Whitehead 
and Russell parted company! Yet this passage indicates how Whitehead 
thought in terms of 'the nexus', the web of relationships which is made 
up of the actual entities, as in an organism. This is a lively rather 
than a static concept. 
There follows a remarkable transformation; one which makes clear the 
reason why those who insist on definitions and precise analyses are 
reluctant to give credit to the intellectual standing of religion (and 
certainly as Whitehead interpreted it). Having, assured us that the 
religious influence is constantly decaying, he now says that the vision 
already referred to 'is the one element in human experience which persist-
ently shows an upward trend. Gradually, slowly, steadily, the vision 
recurs in history under nobler form and with clearer expression'. 
We learn from this the secret of Whitehead's optimism. Indeed, he 
goes so far as to say that the religious vision is the only true source 
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of optimism; and because of this it justly claims for itself the meed of 
worship. Needless to say, Whitehead would require that a special meaning 
be given to that concept also. It does not follow, however, that this 
special meaning will conflict absolutely with the Judea-Christian basis or ideal 
of worship ... that is, the utter primacy of devotion and service to God, 
followed closely by loving service of our neighbour. The religion which 
is typical of our culture is nothing if not practical in that sense; but 
service of our fellow-man is meant to be an example of our understanding 
of our obligation to God. To know this is absolutely essential for any 
proper understanding of that religion with which we are most familiar; 
and, with this knowledge, to warn ourselves not to assume that when 
Whitehead uses the word 'religion' he refers invariably to the love-service 
phenomenon described in the previous sentence. 
Whitehead reveals himself, and gives a good indication of his character 
when he says 'That religion is strong which in its ritual and modes of 
thought evokes an apprehension of the commanding vision. That worship of 
God is not a rule of safety - it is an adventure of the spirit, a flight 
after the unattainable. The death of religion comes with the repression 
of the high hope of adventure'. 
We hear echoes of those heady words in his other writings; but it 
is necessary to point out that they do not certainly entail 'brotherly 
love', nor do they in any sense exclude it. 
The religious life, whether it is described in terms appropriate 
to human personality, or whether in more abstract terms, is meant to be 
the good life. Not la dolce vita, of course; but the kind of life which 
rational choice would select from alternatives. W.K. Frankena deals 
with this very matter, and uses Whitehead's religious model as his example. 
Referring to Whitehead's plea for the maintenance not only of novelty and 
adventure in life, but also of continuity and tradition, he regrets the 
contemporary tendency to substitute the expression of our individuality 
(at any cost) for standards of excellence. (2.92) Subjectivity takes 
precedence of objectivity. He does not condemn this out of hand, however; 
for he holds that it denotes an attitude to life which, though refusing to 
conform to fixed standards, accepts as a norm the concept of inspiration or 
imagination, which is commonly called 'life'style'. 
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This is not inconsistent with Whitehead's teachings. In fact he 
spoke of 'subjective form' in this connection ..• but, and this is 
important, always in association with reverence. Reverence, on his own 
showing, is part of his understanding of religion. The question can be 
raised at this juncture "Does reverence have a meaning which can be 
ascertained only in relation to some external authority (such as God), 
or can it be understood fully in a purely sociological context, or even 
with reference to oneself?" 
One thing we may assert. To hold to reverence (and duty) as value 
is to go a long way towards avoiding the substitution of the abstract 
for the concrete .•• which, as Sartre has told us, is evil. It was the 
outlook of many thinkers in the Victorian era to recognize the moral 
imperatives of religion and yet to find 'faith' to be incompatible with 
the scientific world-view. But just as the older orthodoxy of religion 
was too narrow to contain knowledge, so now the new orthodoxy of 
materialistic science is too narrow to make room for the feelings and 
aspirations of which individuals are conscious. The growing mass of 
evidence is leading us to make essential relationships between values 
and persons; and in this lies the force of Sartre's remark. (3) 
It follows then that our notions of value will depend very largely 
on our notions of persons - of, that is to say, the nature of personality. 
The traditional religious interpretations still stand; but they have 
given place to interpretations of entirely different sorts. This change 
is part of the complex process which may be called secularization - a 
process in which the completeness of meaning is sought in 'this-world-
process' (saeculum). We cannot consider secularization as a phenomenon 
without considering, more particularly, the effects it will have on 
society in general. This will have important repercussions in education. 
It is reasonable to enquire, therefore, how the secular state may 
be·recognised. Perhaps the most obvious way is that its citizens, whilst 
not denying that certain matters of behaviour are important, will not be 
in general agreement as to what these are, because they will be lacking 
in common aims. In consequence they will be without official symbols of 
unity. This is why societies are disposed to give some measure of 
attention to religious exercises during times of major crisis. Not 
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necessarily because they believe in what they are doing (the speed with 
which the exercises are abandoned as soon as the crisis is over indicates 
this), but rather because in religion they are provided with symbolic 
ways of expressing common emotions engendered by the crisis. 
What of education in the secular state? In the absence of common 
aims, and the consequent uncertainty about symbolic expressions of common 
solidarity, there must be confusion about teaching children 'to behave 
rightly' or 'to judge correctly'. Educational methods would have to 
emphasise empirical, scientific, positivistic matters; and to minimise 
those which were primarily concerned with values. 
But, without clear value-concepts, a citizen is going to find it 
difficult to live in pluralist, secular society because he will lack the 
maturity necessary to enable him to make instructed decisions. So 
Bishop Newbigin enquires, in regard to the various ideal pictures of 
secular society "What will they do in the schools?" 'What seems to be 
quite impossible is to imagine that one can conduct a school in which 
there are no accepted convictions about behaviour and about values. To 
pretend to do so will merely be to be unaware of one's own convictions'.(4.130f) 
In this connection the Ten Points which are enumerated in the Black Paper 
1975 (see Appendix) are of considerable interest. Consideration must also 
be given to the effect of what has been described as 'the hidden curriculum'. 
The qualities of neatness, obedience, and conformity, for example, are 
not without a subtle influence upon the educational authorities. The 
valuation of a student is not related, in other words, entirely to his 
mastery of a subject. Indeed, for his career, conformity could well be as 
important as competence! 
There is no doubt that religion (essentially because of its external 
point of reference) used to provide society wit~ its aims and standards; 
not to mention giving a reason for life itself. Education was concerned 
with explicating these matters, and reverence had a supra-human dimension. 
But it is questionable whether those conditions now obtain to any 
significant degree. 
Whitehead saw the effect and importance of this change, and claimed 
that the whole of our tradition (which, coming from the age of Plato and 
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lasting to the end of the 19th century, informed every phase of our 
culture) is warped 'by the vicious assumption that each generation will 
substantially live amid the conditions governing the lives of its 
fathers and transmit those conditions to mould with equal force the 
lives of its children'. But we are living, so he insists, in the first 
period of human history for which this assumption is false. This too 
is an aspect of secularization. 
He says that in all areas of our culture there were underlying 
assumptions of stability, familiarity, and the value of tradition. 
Sensible or significant changes used to take longer than an average 
life-span to materialise. But now changes are so rapid and so frequent 
that it is difficult to find routines in which to settle. He warns 
that 'the doctrine that routine is dominant in any society that is not 
collapsing must never be lost sight of'. (5.117) His warning sounds 
particularly clearly in an age when change is being commended for its 
own sake, and the disturbing of established values is seen (by enough 
members of the community to make their influence felt) as a virtuous 
activity. 
It is necessary for us then to try to maintain a balance between 
routine and novelty. Is this not a genuine function of religion? And 
does it not have a bearing on duty and reverence? If it is true that a 
person's religion is what is really taken to heart as most reliably real 
and most convincingly valuable - the standard by which everything else is 
judged, no less - then we might expect to find, in contemporary forms 
or interpretations of religion, what people do indeed value most. Not to 
say that, in what they value most, they are inclined to find their religion! 
various surveys have recently been made in America, and especially 
amongst university students; and little evidence, has been found to support 
this ideal. Religion is considered to be a respectable convention, as 
Whitehead declared it to be. This emasculated notion, so different from 
that which obtained when religion was still flowering productively (as a 
rule under persecution or tension) , suggests a reason why religion should 
be studied in depth; and Magee makes the claim that education without 
religion is incomplete. (6.5) He is not the only one, of course, to have 
said that. It has become the fashion, especially amongst those education-
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ists who are keen to ensure that new-style 'religion studies' have a real 
and active place in our schools, to assert this. 
But this is not what Whitehead meant when he said that the essence 
of religion is 'that it be religious', even though it might be a pointer 
in that direction. Magee says that 'education, as distinct from train-
ing, aims at the emancipation of a human being' (6.5); and there is no 
doubt that the major religions of the world, according to their foundation-
statements, have this same aim. (7) 
That education is a life-long and emancipatory process is being 
increasingly recognised; but there is only a short time during which the 
educational process itself is made the centre of our activity. Much 
is learned; much is forgotten: but principles, concepts and values, and 
all the dimensions of a true education, endure long after the information 
has become stale, and skills have been superseded. 
President Nathan Pusey of Harvard (Whitehead's own university) is 
on record as saying that 
It is still uncertain what formal education can do to 
help us towards a religious life. Yet despite many 
difficulties, there is a growing recognition that an 
education which ignores this large, central, perennial, 
and life-giving area of human experience (religion) is 
a kind of play education, and finally a shallow thing. 
(See Magee op.cit. for reference to 'an unpublished 
address'). 
This quotation is of special interest because it reveals a subtle 
change which has crept in - education for religion, rather than religion 
for education! 
Magee has some useful suggestions which might help to an understanding 
of what Whitehead meant by an education which is religious. He says that, 
because of a false sense of democratic tolerance, the idea has grown up 
that to believe is more important than what you believe. The witness of 
history should warn us against this; for nothing can be more horrible 
than man's inhumanity to man in the name of loyalty to false ideals. It 
is imperative that we examine our beliefs, and reject those which are base 
or unworthy, as well as those which are false in fact. 
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Once again we find ourselves in the realm of values; and Magee says 
(rightly, I believe) 
It is important to discover what is truly worth trusting 
and worshipping. To relate this to education again, we 
may say that the central task of education could be 
interpreted as finding for each person a true centre of 
reverence that can function as a root and nourisher of 
every other good, leading to a great cormnonwealth of 
human sharing and fellowship. (6.8) 
Unless this is done we leave the way wide open for false worship; and 
false worship is far more prevalent than no worship. According to Magee 
the religious quality of education shows itself in the investigation of 
a dimension of depth in the whole range of the curriculum. 
Below the technical and factual surface of each discipline 
lie the fundamental presuppositions of truth and value from 
which each discipline springs. (6.8) 
In saying this he is virtually summarising the essentials of Whitehead's 
philosophy of education. 
According to this interpretation 'the religious' relates to an 
education which is both broad and deep, and free from dogmatic assumptions. 
It will place great emphasis on 'disciplined dialogue concerning ultimates'. 
This ideal reflects the Platonic tradition of dialectic, and is seen as the 
way by which clear distinctions are maintained between investigation and 
indoctrination. 
This, it seems to me, is in the true spirit of Whitehead; and it 
agrees with the position he took on religion, education, and also tolerance. 
To come again to what he said about religion, I refer to his statement 
that it 'is a vision of something which stands beyond .•• a bagatelle of 
transient experience'. He was enunciating the religious belief that 
life is a deeper and more significant, more mysterious, affair than super-
ficial observation might lead us to suppose. 
This, as it stands, looks to be almost a trite observation. Nonethe-
less it recognises that, even with the most detailed knowledge of physical 
phenomena, it is still possible for us to overlook a deeper truth - that 
the universe itself 'is a well of mysterious forces and meanings which it 
is fatal to ignore'.(8.238) 
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There are three components in a sound, reliable religion; namely 
authority, tradition, and experience. These are in addition to that other 
integral part, which might be called, in a non-committal way, 'beyond-
ness'. (9) 
With this in mind we can relate those descriptions of religion 
which suggest that it is what a person does with his social relations 
with that well-known one of Whitehead's. This latter must be seen in 
its context, however. The full quotation includes 
Religion is what the individual does with his solitari-
ness - if you are never solitary you are never religious. 
Collective enthusiasms, revivals, institutions, churches, 
rituals, bibles, codes of behaviour, are the trappings of 
religion, its passing forms ..• But the end of religion 
is beyond all this. Accordingly, what should emerge from 
religion is individual worth of character. (10.5) 
In this statement (the negative assertions in which should be observed, 
as well as the positive) Whitehead is not denying that religion has social 
dimensions. Character would be a meaningless concept apart from human 
relationships. What he is insisting on is the inner integrity of the 
genuine religious experience; an integrity that is quite independent of 
all outward show or prudent social agreement. It is this inner integrity 
which should preserve religion against the distortions of magic, super-
stition, or wishful thinking •.. all very common features which have provided 
targets for sceptical antagonists, especially those who have concentrated 
on the shortcomings of religious institutions. 
There can be few religiously-disposed persons who have not, at some 
time or other, been critical of the outward forms of religion. It is when 
one comes to ask "What do we put in their place, and how? What do we do 
to ensure the transmission of tradition, the validity of authority, and the 
reliability of spiritual experience?" that we run into difficulty. A 
common way of escape from this impasse is to see the task as hopeless: or, 
if not hopeless, as pointless, and certainly as one in which religion itself 
has no part to play. 
Or perhaps a more obvious remedy for our social needs or voids is 
to employ a specialist of one sort or another to suggest or supply what is 
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required. Whitehead reminds us that 'another great fact confronting the 
modern world is the discovery of the method of training professionals, who 
specialise in particular regions of thought and thereby progressively add 
to the sum of knowledge within their respective limitations of subject'. (8.244) 
And the academic specialist is sometimes seen (not without reason) as one 
whose mind is active in the exploration of his own speciality but who, in 
his attitude to religion or in his aesthetic tastes, retains the undev-
eloped starting points of experience. 
The ordinary human being is going to be called upon to face situations 
about which there are no precedents, no models. Where will he turn for 
guidance? In earlier days there were areas of expertise, clearly marked 
and fairly static. These, let it be admitted, produced dogmatic attitudes. -
Such attitudes are now dangerous because,of so many things, it can be said 
that they are in a state of flux and expansion; though that fact does not 
condemn the attitude outright. An expert in one field is likely to find 
all his endeavours taken up in maintaining that expertise. In consequence 
he is likely to be unaware of'what is going on in other aFeas. This may 
not be too serious in itself; but it is serious if it produces insularity 
in knowledge. (11.498) 
Whitehead spoke severely about the dangers, in democratic societies, 
which are inherent in professional specialization. The main burden of his 
argument was that it struck at the roots of wisdom, the hall-mark of which 
was balanced judgement. His words on this matter seem to be unduly critical; 
but, as always with his pregnant statements, they must be seen in context. 
What he is impressing on us is the value of breadth and balance rather 
than of depth and specialization; for it is in the former that we shall 
find the vision which a society needs for its motive force. 'My own 
criticism of our traditional educational methods' he says 'is that they 
are far too much occupied with intellectual analysis, and with the acquire-
ment of formularised information'. (8.245 f) The quotations from 
Professor A. Boyce Gibson, in Section One, and J.P. White's analysis of 
the centrality of the humanities as an educational medium add weight to 
this statement of Whitehead. (12.62) 
The assertion that the essence of education is that it be religious 
would be easier to comprehend if we could indeed leave it to specialists 
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to give us expert guidance. But, as we have seen, the religious experience 
is essentially personal. Comprehension would be easier, what is more, if 
we each had a special or unique religious sense (of the sort, for example, 
which Rudolf Otto describes so fully in his book The Idea of the Holy) . 
Whitehead denies the existence of such a thing, and says that we derive 
our religious truths from knowledge acquired when our ordinary sense and 
intellectual operations are at their highest pitch of discipline (any. 
declension from which takes us 'toward the dark recesses of abnormal 
psychology'~). 
This is not so straightforward as it seems; for he is referring 
explicitly to their use in the formation of value-judgements. Religious 
truth brings into our consciousness that permanent side of the universe 
which we can care for. 'It thereby provides a meaning, in terms of value, 
for our own existence, a meaning which flows from the nature of things'(l0.109) 
This reads remarkably like the statement of a theosophist; and, in 
fact, much of what Whitehead says when he is writing specifically of 
religion, and the part played by emotion and perception, is theosophical 
in tone, in the sense that he is describing things which underlie all 
religion(s), and exist in a realm which is not material. In this respect 
he is fairly dogmatic. That he has chosen the best of both worlds in 
this way is revealed in such a remark as this 
Thus an ill-balanced zeal for the propagation of dogma 
bears witness to a certain coarseness of aesthetic 
sensitiveness •.• it shows a strain of indifference to 
the fact that others may require a proportion of 
formulation different from that suitable for ourselves. 
Perhaps our pet dogmas require correction; they may 
even be wrong. (10.113) 
His argument against dogma seems to be that as it is the product of 
the thoughts and experiences of other persons or societies it is likely 
to be stultifying to individuals here and now. (Did he inherit none from 
Plato?). Every individual must resort to certain vital dogmas which evoke 
a response from him, and make his own religious life fruitful. They are 
already there; he enters into that heritage. Whitehead admits to this; 
and, for that reason, insists upon the central importance of solitariness. 
But, as an absolute solitariness is impossible, the individual must both 
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learn from others and also share with others the joy and strength which 
develop out of his own religious experience. This attitude concurs with 
Whitehead's emphasis on, for example, tolerance; and certainly has a 
bearing on what he says about duty and reverence. But more to the point 
at issue, it illustrates the emphasis Whitehead gave to the purely mental 
aspects of religion. As he put it himself 'progress in truth •.• truth of 
science and truth of religion .•. is mainly a progress in the framing of 
concepts, in discarding artificial abstractions of partial metaphors, 
and in evolving notions which strike more deeply into the root of reality'. (10.117) 
This is the dilemma of religious education. And although, as has been 
stated, this dissertation is not about religious education as such, the 
dilemma cannot be avoided when we seek the meaning of the statement that 
'the essence of education is that it be religious'. 
Whitehead finds the essential quality of religion to be a wisdom which 
is derived from two great universal sources. We learn about our world by 
empirical observation, and scientific method; and this gives us the more 
immediate forms of knowledge. If with this is blended an aesthetic aware-
ness which takes us beyond the range of the immediate, we have the wisdom 
which enables us both to direct our practice, and to analyse what we know. 
Both these elements flow, according to Whitehead 'from the nature of 
things'. (cf. 10.128) 
In sum then, Whitehead suggests that religion, if it is to stay alive, 
needs the inspiration of art, and the firm support of dogma - provided 
always, one supposes, that art does not become corybantic, (13) and the 
dogma dry bones! He would have found support in the words of William James 
who, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, wrote 'there must be something 
solemn, serious, and tender about any attitude which we denominate religious. 
If glad it must not grin or snicker; if sad, it must not scream or curse'. 
In view of the distinctions and differences within religions and 
between religions (a matter of increasingly precise study) it is not proper 
to use the word 'religious' as Whitehead uses it in our title-sentence. 
But then, neither could he properly have used 'classical' or 'humanist' 
as alternatives. If any such word is to be used, its use must inevitably 
imply certain presuppositions. In the case we are considering, we can 
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see that Whitehead meant by religion a phenomenon, or a pattern of 
thought and ideals, based upon a Platonic model, safeguarded by rational 
thought, enlivened by imagination, ennobled by tolerance, and leading 
on to strong ethical activity. And there is no single ideal word for 
that! 
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Notes to Section Two 
1. Whitehead, A.N., Science and the Modern World, C.U.P., 1926. 
2. Frankena, W.K., Ethics, 2nd Edition, Prentice-Hall Inc. 
"A.N. Whitehead, closer to romanticism and evolutionism (sc, than 
Plato was) thought that it should include novelty and adventure, 
as well as continuity and tradition, and that it should include 
them in some kind of rhythm of alternation. There is a view 
abroad today ..• ever since the romantic era ••• which disparages 
both satisfactoriness and excellence in favour of autonomy, 
authenticity, commitment, creativity, decision, doing your own 
thing, freedom, self-expression, striving, struggle, and the like. 
This view is not tenable in any literal or extreme form in my 
opinion, but it contains an important truth, namely that the 
best life one is capable of must have form, not just in the sense 
of pattern, but in the sense of being inspired by a certain attitude, 
posture, or 'life-style'. Whitehead called this 'subjective form' 
and thought that reverence should be the dominant style in our lives, 
though he mentioned others." (my emphasis). 
And John Passmore (The Revolt against Science, Current Affairs 
Bulletin, Vol. 51, No.7, p.26) reminds us that 
"It is in this spirit (sc. of Herman Hesse) that the artist now tells 
us that he is what matters, not his art, and the student that what 
matters is not the truth of what he says, but only that it is what he 
thinks. Nothing could be more opposed to the scientific spirit than 
this attitude of mind. For the scientist what is essential about a 
person is what he achieves; what he is looking for is not a way to 
himself but to understanding the world." 
3. Here we have an illustration of a perennial problem which comes into 
everyone's reckoning sooner or later. This perennial problem arose 
along with the secularization of society; and that secularization is 
a reality which will be with us evermore, unless there is some global 
catastrophe which throws mankind right back again to its beginnings: 
for then, presumably, the whole pattern of religious development, 
with its crudities, its superstitions, its naivetes - and its 
splendours - would be worked-over once again. 
4. Newbigin, L., Honest Religion for Secular Man, S.C.M. Press, 1966. 
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5. Whitehead, A.N., Adventures of Ideas, Macmillan, 1969. 
6. Magee, J.B., Religion and Modern Man, Harper and Row, 1967. 
7. For example, 'You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make 
you free' - John, Chapter 8, Verse 32; though this was a salvific 
statement rather than a pedagogic. 
8. Whitehead, A.N., Science and the Modern World, C.U.P., 1953. 
9. Unless we are going to assume that Whitehead's use of the word 
'religion' comprehended at all times a universality which included 
(say) Buddhism or Jainism, we must, it seems to me, assume that he 
was allowing room for the supranatural in his thinking. Because 
there is no opportunity to be more specific than that, I have 
referred to 'beyondness'. 
10. Whitehead, A.N., Religion in the Making, C.U.P., 1953. 
11. Kandel, I.L., Education for Complete Living, ed., Cunningham and 
Radford, A.C.E.R., 1938. 
'The danger that confronts mankind today comes not from 
the expansion of education, but from specialization in 
some narrow corner .•• the necessity for integration, 
of a general conspectus, becomes all the more urgent'. 
He quotes Ortega y Gassett -
'For science needs from time to time, as a necessary 
regulator of its own advance, a labour of reconstitution, 
and, as I have said, this demands an effort towards 
unification which grows more and more difficult, involving 
as it does, ever vaster regions of the world of knowledge'. 
12. White, J.P., Towards a Compulsory Curriculum R.K.P., 1973. 
12a. Attention should be drawn to a recent (August, 1975) publication 
of the British Humanist Association entitled Objective, Fair and 
Balanced. 
13. Max Weber ~ells of "the marked rejection of all distinctively 
esthetic devices by those religions which are rational, in our 
special sense. These are Judaism, ancient Christianity, and -
later on - ascetic Protestantism". Orgiastic religion, he says, 
"leads most readily to song and dance; ritualistic religion 
inclines towards the pictorial arts; religions enjoining love 
favour the development of poetry and music". Weber, by giving 
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details of his idea of the relationship between forms of art 
and forms of religion, is more specific than Whitehead is, 
with his more general statements of 'aesthetic'. (Sociology of 
Religion, Methuen, p.125). 
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Section Three 
Duty and Reverence as the Aim of Education? 
"The object of an education is the realisation of a faithful, pure, 
inviolate, and hence, holy life" - Froebel 
" 'Tis education forms the common mind 
Just as the twig is bent, the tree's inclined" - Pope 
The writings of Whitehead are difficult to analyse, partly because 
of their scope and partly because of their variety. In some places 
they are almost 'popular•, and one tends to hurry through these and 
assume that they are simple and straightforward. In other places they 
are profound and tightly argued, and in these places also one could 
easily overlook an important statement which alters, perhaps, the whole 
course of a discussion which one had felt to be au fait with. This is 
especially true of his writings about God. He was in the habit, also, 
of using unfamiliar terms when more usual or traditional ones would have 
served the purpose quite adequately. 
But some of his statements, though of a popular nature, are so 
definite that they close off certain lines of argument. We have seen, 
for example, that his statement 'the essence of education is that it be 
religious' is not on behalf of any sectional, dogmatic, institutional, 
or ecclesiastical type of instruction. Equally it is clear that it does 
not recommend a positivistic system of accumulating and assessing facts. (1) 
Had Whitehead been alive today he would have been able to call on 
all the contemporary adjuncts of education - the 'hardware', the electronic 
and other types of machinery - and no doubt he would have made full use 
of them. But with reserve, one suspects, becaus'e such technical assistance 
could endanger one of his basic ideas about education, that of the living 
contact between greater mind and lesser mind. The contact can be had 
through books, of course; for, as we have it on the authority of Milton, 
'A good book is the precious life-blood of a master spirit, embalmed and 
treasured up on purpose to a life beyond life'. The proper and diligent 
use of books, especially those of a timeless quality, allows us to come 
to grips with the thoughts of the authors in a way that reference to 
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arbitrary selections from their works makes impossible. Anything which 
helps us to be transfused with that life-blood will be of benefit to us; 
but anything which gives us only selections or illustrations by another 
person through mechanical means will do us despite if it misleads us into 
thinking that we have had the wholeness of an author. Free access to 
books is indicative of a positive attitude towards freedom of choice; 
and freedom of choice leads to a widening of intellectual horizons. 
The spoken word has an immediacy which the written word does not have; 
but it is only the latter which can acquire the quality of transformed 
speech in which lies the essence of creative expression. McLuhan is a 
spokesman for those who think that books are destined to become obsolete 
because the written word is frozen and silent. It is significant that 
Sartre, now that he is nearly blind, has said "I go on thinking; but 
writing having become impossible for me, the real activity of the,thinking 
has, in a way, been suppressed". 
Now although the traditional approach to the use of books is an 
integral part of Whitehead's educational policy, in trying to work out a 
methodology from him we have always to remember that what appear to be 
methods often turn out to be, in fact, ideals. It is-worth pointing out 
that Wnitehead's definition of education, which we are here considering, 
constitutes a serious challenge to those who maintain that any appearance 
of order or design in the world is, in truth, fortuitous. If this were 
indeed true, and if in fact there were no such thing as an abiding law of 
causation, it is difficult to see how any methodology in education could be 
worked out at- all. There would certainly be no profit in looking to the 
past and we should have to deny that there are always underlying ideals and 
assumptions. 
Here is another illustration of the impossibility of thorough-going 
consistency. Consistency (even though Emerson described it as the 
hobgoblin of little minds) presupposes order; order presupposes that which 
orders ••• and this, I take it, lies behind Whitehead's definition of the 
essence of education. Whatever else he did or did not believe about 
religion, he associated it definitely with a concept of order. In this, 
in his devotion to the written works of master minds, and in his reliance 
on structured educational forms, we can see evidences of a spirit which, in 
-28-
a different context, would, without hesitation, be called religious. 
Whitehead pleads for the deliberate maintenance of an eager humility in 
education, coupled with a faith that there is an order in life, and that 
it is accessible to us. Accessible, if not completely comprehensible. 
This faith is a,methodology in itself, and by it we can proceed slowly 
towards goals which are for ever unattainable. 
For the particular outlook or philosophy which Whitehead represents 
(vide A. Boyce Gibson) this gliding-over from methods to ideals and from 
ideals to methods, is quite satisfying and satisfactory. For a mechanistic 
or positivistic philosophy it is a fatal objection! It is too imprecise 
to be practical. Whitehead's insistence upon the aesthetic and the 
speculative must prove objectionable to certain kinds of thinker. One 
can hardly be more definite than that; because of no one person might it 
be said that he thinks utterly and at all times in one particular 'set', 
and no other. 
Whitehead faces the universe and accepts it; but we would not say 
of him what Carlyle is alleged to have said of Margaret Fuller 'By Gad, 
she'd better!'. In him there is all the time the cosmologist, as it 
were. (2.110) The evidences of nature, of life, of personal relationships 
even, convinced him of the existence of a greater reality which was 
independent of these evidences (see Note 3). William James expressed a 
similar avowal very strongly in Lecture XX of The Varieties of Religious 
Experience. That non-contingent reality is not 'the God of the churches' 
however, nor 'the God of the Bible', nor 'the Father of Jesus'. The 
first is excluded because of the errors and failings of the churches, the 
sects, and the denominations. The second is excluded because of the moral 
inconsistencies we meet in that conglomerate of holy writings which we 
call the Bible. The third is excluded because the idea itself, if not 
intrinsically absurd, is too restricted. Nowhere did I find Whitehead 
saying anything .like C.S. Lewis said - how that when he met the incarnate 
god in the mythologies, he accepted the idea with no hesitation, but when 
he met it in Christianity he at first rejected it (though he accepted it 
after a struggle). Whitehead grew to reject it, as part of an apologetic; 
but he did not turn against the moral implications (as revealed in the 
New Testament) of the Incarnation, as did Nietzsche or Shelley, for example. 
The point I am making however is that Whitehead was not speaking about 
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Christian initiation, or instruction in the Christian religion, when he 
said that the essence of education is that it be religious. We must be 
quite clear on that score. 
On the strength of what I have just written I could maintain that 
though Whitehead was not a hostile anti-Christian, he was not a 
conventional Christian either. He did not reject, however, the moral 
ideals of the Christian religion (perhaps because he saw nothing unique 
about them), or the challenge to adventure that living the Christian life 
made. It is as if he were reluctant to make a definite pro-Christian 
statement or assent for fear he would attract to himself a label or a way 
of life which would restrict him. We may go so far with safety as to say 
that he saw God as the Order in Things; and believed that if education 
were to be religious, it was also to be 'orderly'. To put it another way. 
Because good education had to be ordered (i.e. with structure, content, 
progression, reference to ideals and goals, etc.) good education would be 
religious. 
Now there is nothing in this concept of Order which militates against 
the speculative or the aesthetic. What it does contradict is that attitude 
to life which depends for its nourishment on the wasting of time, the 
fancying of idle speculation, the revelling in feeling for feeling's sake. 
Thus we should have to say that religion, to Whitehead, did not mean what 
it meant to Ritschl or Shleiermacher either. What is more, the concept 
of Order is so great a thing that it requires of us constant efforts, not 
of acceptance so much as of challenge. If it does not necessarily follow 
that 'to challenge means to think', to think does involve us inevitably 
in challenge. The challenge is for us to delineate for ourselves ideas 
which we can accept at first-hand. 
There is danger here. It is easy to say "I do not understand; 
therefore it has no value". Whitehead would have been distressed if 
anyone had made ~uch deductions from his premises. Yet if we are to 
consider an educational methodology we have to build-in some safeguards 
against this danger. Unfortunately, although the "I do not understand: 
I do not accept" attitude is very prevalent, an alternative - that "because 
I know or see the best (in morals, in art, in knowledge) I pursue it" - is 
not really viable. St. Paul was more correct in his diagnosis of the human 
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situation than Socrates was, in this respect. The personal point of 
view is not all-important, even though in the ultimate every individual 
has to say for himself 'I accept' or 'I reject'. Whitehead's way with 
this difficulty would be to put in front of the pupil models of the best, 
and, at the same time, to try to develop in him resilience, self-confidence, 
and comprehensive awareness so that he would make for himself his own rules 
and standards. As an educational method this would make tremendous assump-
tions about, and demands of, the teacher! From my own experience I would 
say that Whitehead was right to hold such ideals. From my own experience 
also I know that it is impossible to produce a method which would guarantee 
a full and infallible success-rate. This, to be sure, is part of the price 
we must pay for being human; for, unless we are thinking in terms of 
purely mechanistic or reflexive response, there are no educational guarant-
ees to be offered. The teacher can only provide of his best and his 
highest (which he himself has acquired), point out the models and ideals, 
and hope that the pupil will find it worth his while to adopt them for 
himself. (4.498) By adopting this attitude I contradict, no doubt, those 
who see as a possibility the systematizing of educational methods in 
quantitative terms. 
From which subjects are these models to be offered? Again we shall 
speak with conviction rather than with certainty. Whitehead has said that 
where it is in our power to change the course of events (presuming that 
there is general agreement that change is required) , then if we do not arm 
ourselves with the necessary knowledge to enable us to make the change, 
ignorance is vice. This is what he means by duty. It follows then that 
'religious education' (in the Whitehead sense) comprises the factual, the 
instrumental, and the technical. Subjects which come under these heads 
have, in recent years, been given a special place in the educationists' 
armamentarium. Yet now there are signs of a move to restore some of the 
'traditional subjects' to the place from which uhey had been ejected in 
recent educational trends, because a necessity for the humane models they 
alone can supply is being admitted. 
Whitehead couples duty with reverence. I take this to mean that though 
we must learn how to change a situation we must also know (a) why we want 
to change it, and (b) why it needs to be changed. Whilst at no time 
minimising the necessity of our knowing how to do things, and achieve 
results, he emphasises that the necessity must be seen in the context of 
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our knowing why to do them. 
This presupposes a purpose in life, an order, a design. Not 
necessarily one purpose, nor any 'grand design'; but a conviction 
(which varies from time to time, and place to place) that there is 
order in things. This is a religious attitude; and it leads Whitehead 
to put much weight on 'the present moment'. But note; this is not 
something ephemeral. It sums up the past, it is the seed out of which 
the future grows. This itself is a linear process (according to our 
Western tradition): but the method by which Whitehead would have us 
understand it is the cyclic. He explains what this means in the Essay, 
The Rhythm of Education in The Aims of Education. In this cyclic method 
it is likely that the pupil has a greater opportunity for freedom of 
development than he would have in the linear. Whitehead sees this 
freedom as an educational ideal. Freedom is yet another religious motif; 
and, at the risk of neglecting evidence to the contrary, one might say 
that freedom of the individual is a basic theme in the major religions -
at any rate in their pristine condition. 
It is an unhappy fact of experience however that the quest for free-
dom often leads the individual into religious methodologies and sets of 
rules which come to assume the qualities of bondage. Freedom is an ideal; 
it is a value. As such it is easy enough to make grand claims for it. 
In actual practice it is always regulated, and shaped to a pattern. 
Otherwise it becomes untidy, lawless, and counter-productive. 
Whitehead recognises this as a danger in educational systems which 
make over-much use of self-expression. What is the self which is to be 
expressed? Something loose, inchoate, amorphous? Or something which has, 
from the first, been hardened and sharpened? That he is in favour of the 
latter idea we deduce from Whitehead's references to work and discipline 
as values. The self has to be made worthy of expression! Self-expression 
is good only if it is rightly directed. Without this caveat it leads to 
selfishness and chaos. 
'The self' includes the body. Whitehead, although giving the highest 
place to spiritual values and mental achievements, does not make the 
mistake of belittling or neglecting the body. It is, after all, the 
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vehicle by which and through which we gain our experiential knowledge. 
It is by the body that we do what is our duty and demonstrate our 
reverence. There is no valuing of asceticism for its own sake in 
Whitehead's writing, only an acknowledging of the need for such bodily 
discipline as shall permit of good productive work being done. In this 
respect he follows the Jewish idea which is essentially religious. 
Work is to be held in highest esteem. The Jews, however, based their 
ideal on the belief that God (the personal, individual entity) worked. 
Whitehead seems to take the more passive Greek approach in which the 
Order of Things is more the Contemplator and less the Artisan. And yet, 
typical of the Jewish outlook also is 'How shall he get wisdom that 
holdeth the plough?'. There is then, in both outlooks, the suggestion 
that there is a quality of wisdom which is available only to those who 
can give the necessary attention to spiritual truths and values in 
solitude. It is in solitude that one can get fully to grips with certain 
basic problems which do not yield to the dialectic process. Some problems 
yield to facts; some problems are clarified by discussion; but some can 
be solved only at the existential level, "What does this mean for me? 
What must I do about it? I alone know what is my duty, and I alone can 
do it". 
If this is indeed so, one can see what Whitehead had in mind when 
he spoke of the religious character of education. One can also see why 
there has been such a development of public clangour over the past century 
against the teaching of religion. Religion, in the conventional sense, 
has its sets of values and standards of truth. It can only assert them, it 
cannot demonstrate them; they are objectives which cannot have an empirical 
base. What, then, can 'education' mean in this sense? Whitehead made 
heroic attempts to square what he saw as objective truths with reality, 
without availing himself of the benefits of revealed religion. Yet some 
of his statements are so definite - and that without a demonstrable factual 
base - that we could be excused for thinking that he felt himself to have 
some personal sense of revelation. Though this chimes in with his ideas 
about knowledge, which will be described in Section Four. 
With the current emphasis in our schools upon studies of a societal 
and sociological character it is not to be wondered at that little room can 
-33-
be found for 'studies in religion' as such. The exploration of personal 
religious experience is usually left to religious clubs or groups. This 
means, in effect, that apart from the religious influences of home (and 
church perhaps) the average pupil will come across precious little to 
help him understand the meaning of religion, and its contribution to 
culture, until he is at least sixteen. By which time he has, in all 
probability, been convinced against it! It is difficult to see how this 
situation might be overcome - assuming it to be thought desirable that it 
should be overcome; and the 'teaching' of art, literature, or music suggests 
that it might be. 
The ambition of Whitehead (as set out in the two title-sentences) 
might be seen as a solution. Starting with an emphasis on duty and rev-
erence, and working this out in the field of personal relationships, and 
stating moral decisions in terms that are appropriate and comprehensible 
to different age-groups, one might come eventually to an education which 
was, in essence, religious. Such a policy would not be without its perils. 
Patriotism or nationalism, or almost any ideology, could be given a relig-
ious interpretation, with perverse and appalling results. (5) 
All that can be said for certain about this is that, again and again, 
a position would be reached of which it would have to be said 'We do not 
know. We can only select. We must do our best to be fair and objective. 
Life can be lived at a worthwhile level only if we take account of the 
needs and rights of other people. What these are we can best discover by 
personal assessment of the claims made by the teachers and leaders in 
different human societies at different times in their history'. This is 
typical of the religious attitude towards life - the leaving of open ends 
and unsettled arguments; the refusal to confuse symbols with realities; 
the realisation that poetry rather than prose is proper for the deeper 
moments of life; and the willingness to admit that even one's enemies 
have the right to a point of view. 
Not all teachers could, would, or would have the opportunity to 
teach to these ideals. Some subjects would not lend themselves to it. 
But where it could be done, if could be given a decent measure of 
objectivity. This is what Whitehead looked for. 
On the other hand, if timidity about religious indoctrination, or 
reluctance to make use of the arts as educational media, leads education-
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ists into providing nothing more than 'moral studies', then religion 
will be seen as no more than a small component of a sociology, or integrated-
studies course. And that is not what Whitehead had in mind. 
If it be said that in a social climate which is becoming increasingly 
secular, the concept of 'religion' must be avoided as far as possible, it 
is reasonable to enquire "But what is this secularization which stands 
over against the religious way of life?" Whether it will have a meaning 
or not depends very largely on what meaning we first give to religion. 
If we are to make any sort of identification between religion and church 
attendance, then, truly enough, secularization is growing; and the schools 
of our pluralist society should not teach religion (though they may be 
permitted to teach about it), nor should we give much heed to Whitehead's 
dictum. Religion would be seen, at best, as a collection of bits of 
information; but at no cost, as a way of understanding life. 
If, on the other hand, religion be related to some special human 
q~ality or apprehension, then secularization must refer to some fundamental 
change in human psychology. This would be far harder to demonstrate than 
a decline in church attendance; yet one feels that Whitehead's sympathies 
lay more in this area of psychology than in the statistics of a sociological 
phenomenon. - And if that is indeed so, he would have agreed with those 
who say that an education from which religious teachings and values are 
omitted, or have been eliminated, is not so full an education (qualitatively 
as well as quantitatively) as should be available for every pupil. 
For one thing it is extremely unlikely that without them the pupils 
would be taught about duty or reverence. Why should they be? Where would 
one look for criteria? To ask this is not to fall into the trap of making 
religion the only valid criterion for morality; but, as Lord Devlin told 
us in his Maccabean Lecture for 1959, on The Enforcement of Morals, no 
society has yet evolved a satisfactory moral system without some sort of 
religious roots or value-system either. To put it another way. Whitehead's 
idea that the essence of education is that it be religious is really saying 
that education cannot be value-free (wertfrei) or value-neutral. (6) 
One cannot avoid the impression that an expressed desire for a value-
neutral educational system is really an expression of an anti-religious 
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ideology rather than a genuine objective educational concept. For is 
society, in fact, now secularized to such an extent that it is utterly 
different from what it was in, say, the sixteenth century, or even the 
earlier part of the twentieth? Do the human beings who comprise society 
really change radically over short intervals of time? There are enough 
to say they do; but is the question then settled, categorically? 
It deserves fair investigation, for it is not merely rhetorical. If 
we could limit 'religion' to one small definition, it might be possible 
to give a clear and simple answer to the religious/secular debate. But 
what appears to be the case is that although some of the traditional 
value-systems and thought-patterns (enshrined in structured religious 
groups) have declined in public interest, support, and power, their place 
has been taken by what have been called 'religion-surrogates'. These 
alternatives have developed their own groupings, hierarchies, and symbol-
systems. The great difference between now and then is that the individual 
in contemporary society has a large number of options open to him towards 
which he may look for guidance in working out his own life; whereas in 
days gone by he would have had to rely a great deal more on prefabricated 
answers provided for him. One might say, rather loosely, that more and 
more answers to religious questions are now being provided from secular 
sources. Under the general heading or description of dogmatism there is 
now a huge number of -isms, to any of which people may willingly give 
their allegiance. What seems certain is that no one person stands completely 
free from any and every kind of -ism; or, by implication, from some kind of 
dogma or ideology. 
I am inclined to believe that Whitehead did not have this situation 
in mind; and that he would have wished to ascribe a more limited meaning 
to religion. For example, religion was for him·a form of social idealism. 
The world is to be made a better place by the development of the individual 
personality and the improvement of society according to certain patterns 
(such as those I have described briefly). All this involved, for him, a 
religious-type ideology, and an educational methodology. 
In spite of the criticisms he levels against various aspects of this 
world, its events and its history, he does not sugges~ transcending it. 
To that extent his idea of ·religion lacks 'religious substance'. It is as 
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an idealist that Whitehead has no place for the church, or the religious 
institution. This must be borne in mind when we consider his definitions 
of education along religious lines. Yet I am sure that he would not have 
said "The word 'religion' may be applied to almost anything, now that 
there are so many alternatives about". He would have insisted that it be 
tightly associated with that which necessarily involves duty and reverence. 
But then, of course, the critical task becomes that of defining, not 
religion primarily, but duty and reverence. 
Duty can be required of its members by any group, secular or sacred. 
If membership is voluntary, then duty is a willing and willed obligation. 
If membership is compulsory or accidental, then the authorities at the 
head of the structure can impose what conditions they choose, and call 
them duty - or right, or truth! Provided they have the strength sufficient 
for their enforcement. (7.180f) 
But reverence is different. As a priest once said to me "It is bad 
enough that the people no longer know the meaning of 'sanctus'. What is 
far worse is that they do not know the meaning of 'holy'". To translate 
words into strictly meaningful contemporary equivalents (as is done, for 
example, in revised liturgical texts) often necessitates the destruction 
of a numinous atmosphere which had a value of its own. This applies in 
all literary fields. It applies also to an education from which imagination, 
romance, or even magic has been expunged. 
Whitehead saw in God a reality and a source of values before which 
human beings needed to adopt a posture of humility. It was part of the 
purpose of education to inculcate this posture. It involved living in 
the present moment (my moment, here), but seeing that .!_ had meaning only 
in relation to you or to them; just as the now had meaning only as part 
of the sequence of the past and future. Before such greatness the pupil 
is to be protected against the crudeness or brashness of an educational 
method or pretension which might lead him to suppose that the acquisition 
of never so many facts or techniques entitles him to believe that he can 
know it all. 
Education is considered to be so obviously valuable that, for a 
certain number of years of his life, every person in our land is to be 
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submitted to a situation, or a process, to which we give the name 
'educational'. This has been the pattern in Western civilized countries 
for a long time. There are many authorities (such as T.L. Jarman, in 
his Landmarks in the History of Education) to remind us of the basal 
relationship between religion and education; and of this relationship 
Whitehead, by virtue at least of his own educational background, could 
hardly fail to be aware. 
Questions are now being asked about education itself. Whether it is 
equivalent to schooling, and whether it should be applied to everyone. 
It is not my purpose to make any comments or predictions in this respect. 
I would only insist that there is a timeless quality about whatever is 
implied under the words religious, duty, and reverence; and that whatever 
methods be adopted for the transmission of what any particular society 
considers to be both valuable and useful, if education is to have any 
fullness of meaning, it must be related to those three concepts. (8) 
I am happy to find that, at least in this respect, I am able to 
stand in the company of Alfred North Whitehead. 
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Notes to Section Three 
1. It is worth commenting that Kant, in his Doctrine of Virtue 
also discussed dialogue and catechism. "But the doctrine" (i.e. 
the theory of virtue) can be delivered either in a lecture, as 
when all those to whom it is directed are a mere audience, or by 
the method of questioning, in which the teacher asks his pupil 
what he wants to teach him. And this method of questioning is, 
in turn, divided into the method of dialogue and that of catechism, 
depending on whether the teacher addresses his questions to the 
pupil's reason or merely to his memory. For if the teacher wants 
to question his pupil's reason he must do this in a dialogue in 
which teacher and pupil reciprocally question and answer each 
other". (From Doctrine of Virtue trans Mary J. Gregor, New York, 
1964, p.149f). 
2. Hill, M.A., A Sociology of Religion, H.E.B., Paperback, 1973. 
Another vital consequence implied in this theology (sc. of Calvin) 
is that, since the natural world is also created by God and reveals 
his will, the best way to know God is to study his work. These, 
like man, are submitted to a preordained order. Belief in a 
natural order, it has been suggested, is an important factor 
in the growth of modern science; on this we might quote Whitehead's 
statement that 'The basic assumption in modern science "is a 
widespread, instinctive conviction in the existence of an Order 
of Things, and, in particular, of an Order of Nature". 
3. Peters, R.S. in The Philosophy of Open Education, ed. Nyberg, D. 
International Library of the Philosophy of Education, R.K.P., 1975, 
wrote 
By the 'givenness of the world' I mean such things as 
the phenomena co-ordinated by the law of gravitation 
or the indescribable stickiness of putty that has not 
been mixed to the right consistency, the heat of the 
fire or the expansion of metal when subjected to it. 
In the face of these palpable features of our life on 
earth I am constantly amazed at some of the extravagances 
issuing from modern sorties in the sociology of knowledge. 
4. Kandel, I.L., in Education for Complete Living, 1938. 
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Those who glibly quote Matthew Arnold's definition 
of culture as a knowledge of the best that has been 
said and thought in the past fail to continue with the 
rest of the definition - "that the will of God may 
prevail" - which has a practical, social implication, 
however one may interpret the theological reference. 
5. Miguel de Unamuno, just before he died of a broken heart (as stated 
in The Poet's War, an A.B.C. radio programme, February 29th 1976) 
made a courageously defiant speech from the platform of the 
University of Salamanca, at which he was the Rector. He described 
the university as a temple of learning, and himself as the high 
priest. Was this simply a rhetorical conceit? Hardly, in the 
revolutionary circumstances of the time. It was an agonised 
expression of an idea identical to that which Whitehead had ••• 
the sanctity of learning, and the nobility of wisdom. 
6 • It is fashionable to assume that a teleological interpretation 
of the universe is no longer tenable - as ideal or method -
since the time of Darwin. This is one reason for the insecurity 
which is felt about value-systems. It should be pointed out, 
however, that Darwin was not an anti-teleologist. He said indeed 
"I deserve to be called a theist" because, when he wrote his 
Origin of Species, the conviction of there being an intelligent 
source of Nature weighed heavily on him. Asa Gray, in an 
article in Nature, observed that Darwin's great service to natural 
science was to bring it back to teleology in such a way that it 
could co-operate with morphology. To this Darwinreplied"What 
you say about teleology pleases me especially" (cf. Life of Charles 
Darwin, p. 291). 
7. Rappold, F.C., in Education for Complete Living, says, 
Our task is much more difficult than that of educators 
in the totalitarian states, for our creed compels us to 
regard each boy and girl not only as a member of the 
community, but also as an individual, entitled to the 
fullest measure of self-development, free, within certain 
limits, to think and act as he or she wishes ... To us life 
cannot be good unless it is based on liberty. 
It is one of the tragedies of education that religious 
differences have resulted in its (education) so often 
being secularized. I can conceive of no sound educa-
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tional system which is not fundamentally religious in 
its basis ... Far more than from actual teaching, a child 
absorbs its scale of values from the life, the tone, the 
atmosphere, of the school in which it is educated ... 
What this distraught, unhappy world needs is a revival 
of the religious view of life. 
Rappold, writing at about the same time as Whitehead was writing 
most of the works to which I refer, had been ·headmaster at one of 
the more famous English public schools, with a specifically religious 
foundation. Yet he laments the neglecting of 'the physical, the 
aesthetic, the spiritual' in an educational system which concentrates 
on academic attainments). 
8. Ortega y Gassett in his Mission of the University (P.137f) points 
out that characteristics, national or individual, are not the 
product of education. He describes as a pious idealism the idea 
that nations are great because their schools are good - pious 
because it attributes to the school a force which it neither has 
nor can have. This remark in itself is not specially noteworthy. 
But what follows is, I feel, far more noteworthy. 'Certainly when 
a nation is great, so will be its schools. There is no great nation 
without great schools. But the same holds for its religion, its 
statesmanship, its economy, and a thousand other things. A nation's 
greatness is the integration of many elements'. (Whatever inter-
pretation we give to 'great' as related to a nation must, presumably, 
be applied also to educatio"n.) 
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Section Four 
Whitehead's Educational Theory and Philosophy 
"Education is a development of the whole man .... the ultimate end 
of man is happiness with God". - Comenius 
It has already been mentioned that Whitehead, when writing about 
general topics, was somewhat discursive. It goes without saying, therefore, 
that if the direction of his thought about any particular matter is to be 
discovered, it is necessary that his more famous and popular works (such 
as Adventures of Ideas,(l) and Science and the Modern World) should be 
consulted. His thoughts about education were, however, marshalled in 
The Aims of Education and Other Essays (given as separate papers on 
different occasions) . In a work of larger scope than the present one there 
would need to be a summary of that book. As it is, brief references only 
will be made to it. 
The essays were first published in book form in 1932, (thus pre-dating 
the Dewey statement in the preface to this work), eight years after 
Whitehead had gone to America; and they reflect his British experience 
and background. Unlike most writing on educational topics, more especially 
in recent years, they are unencumbered with statistical information and 
empirical data. Their style is, naturally, that of the lecture; thus the 
emphasis is on principles rather than details. This is consistent, perhaps, 
with his famous apophthegm, given at the conclusion of an Ingersoll Lecture 
on Immortality - 'Exactness is a fake'! 
There are ten essays in the book, and the first five are of chief 
importance for our purpose. Though they provide clear pointers to 
Whitehead's views on education neither they, nor the complete ten, may 
be considered as definitive of those views. 'Whitehead on Education' is, 
in truth, 'Whitehead on Life'. It is too much, therefore, to hope for 
a comprehensive treatment of the subject in so short a compass. 
It is to be expected that the man who said 'I contend that the 
notion of mere knowledge is a high abstraction and that conscious 
discrimination itself is a variable factor only present in the more 
elaborate examples of occasions of experience. The basis of experience is 
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emotional' (2.28) should make of education a vital subject. He was 
impatient of abstract notions, and was fully aware of the limitations of 
both logic and science. His critique of abstraction is a critique of 
the abstract, impersonal, quantifying rationality; and his objection 
to abstraction is precisely that, through it, a partial impulse becomes 
equated with the whole. His philosophy of organism is a protest on 
behalf of the living body as whole; and he protests also 'on behalf of 
value' by insisting that the real structure of the human body, of human 
cognition, and of the events cognized, is erotic, creative 'self-enjoyment'. 
This is his way of objecting to the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness. (3) 
Whitehead could reduce a complex argument or situation _to a neatly-
turned phrase, as when he said that the justification for a university 
was 'that it preserves the connection between knowledge and the zest for 
life, by uniting the young and the old in the imaginative consideration 
of learning'. This reference to the university, incidentally, reminds us 
how Whitehead sometimes gave the impression of knowing about education 
only from, and at, the higher levels. But again, that is consistent 
with his method of being more concerned with principles than with details. 
He gives us what is now called 'an educational overview'; and we must 
be prepared to find that, in details,this is misleading. In no place, 
for example, does he make allowance for different 'capability levels' 
in children; and, at the risk of misinterpreting the motives of so large 
a mind and so generous a soul, I would say that he seems at times to 
think more of the programme than of the individual child. Perhaps this 
was because he wanted every child to have access to the best and the 
finest, and that he even went so far as to believe that every child could 
profit therefrom. So we find that although he resembles the great 
Comenius overall (in favouring experimental science, practical matters 
and a broad general education for example), in matters of detail he is 
very different from him. 
As an educationist he insisted on logical perfection and coherence, 
where they could be found; but he insisted no less on the value of 
imagination and lively experience as necessary complements. As Holmes 
says, in commenting on Whitehead's views about the entities from which 
'the whole of things' (a characteristic Whiteheadian expression) is 
built •••. 'Our sharp decisions about meanings, values, causes, and the 
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future, as we draw them from the carefully distinguishable facts of science 
are less definitive than we suppose' (8.622) 
Of education itself, and its relation to religion, Whitehead 
writes 
Education is the guidance of the individual towards a 
comprehension of the art of life; and by the art of 
life I mean the most complete achievement of varied 
activity expressing the potentialities(4) of that 
living creature in the face of its actual environment. 
This completeness of achievement involves an artistic 
sense, subordinating the lower to the higher poss-
ibilities of the individual personality. Science, art, 
religion, morality, take their rise from this sense of 
values within the structure of being. Each individual 
embodies an adventure of existence. The art of life is 
the guidance of this adventure. (My emphasis) 
It is significant that what is, in many respects, his most important 
religious book is entitled Adventures of Ideas. Had he been a chemist 
rather than a mathematician, who also had had a complete grounding in the 
classics(S), he might have made less of the speculative way of thinking -
as a result of his being more accustomed to dealing with actual things. 
As it is he gives more weight to speculation than he gives to dogma on 
the one hand, or to scientific considerations or empirical evidences on 
the other, in his treatment of religious topics. In this context, that 
particular notion does not need to be enlarged beyond the suggestion 
that Whitehead, although a scientist and a logician, found no difficulty 
in contemplating the forms and claims of religion. We might infer from 
this what direction his educational theories are likely to take. 
He did not, of course, fail to appreciate the proper place and value 
of scientific method and statistical analysis; but, so far as education 
was concerned, he put above them that attitude pf mind which gives pride 
of place to insight, feeling, and apprehension. We shall have cause to 
refer again to his criticism of this particular kind of 'objective' 
methodology; but it is difficult to describe with any precision the 
attitude of mind which leads to it. That is why Whitehead's views 
might well be the despair of the educational theorist whose background was 
essentially different from Whitehead's. Holmes points out, for example, 
that Whitehead nowhere refers to educational research, English or 
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American; and that it is useless to look for critical reactions to 
previous or current studies or experiments in education. He gives us, 
instead, the benefit of his own experience and learning as applied to 
'the general ordering and significance of education'. (8.633) 
When we come to consider religion (or, indeed, anything which might 
be said to be of 'cosmic significance') in education we have to face the 
difficulty that such matters could have no place in an educational system 
which was basically scientific or empiricist in its emphasis ..• for they 
are felt on the pulses and not read-off from the charts and tables. Such 
tables and data of precision are related to methods; but methods presuppose 
aims or goals; aims and goals presuppose the acceptance of ideals; and the 
acceptance of ideals presupposes agreement as to values. It was this 
final link in the educational chain with which Whitehead was principally 
concerned. He had strong religious views (the importance of which is 
increasingly coming to be realised) which had a powerful influence on his 
ideas about education. They were, however, in no sense restrictive. So 
Holmes can say, in his exposition of Whitehead's educational theory, 
If objects beyond scientific verification are to be 
brought within the compass of education, speculative 
philosophy would not introduce them as idols, or as 
objects to be accepted as defined, or as fearful 
symbols to be used for the purposes of institutional 
authority. Freedom of worship is a fundamental 
freedom not because it gives religious sects (or 
schools of philosophic thought) the right to regiment 
their followers, but because it makes whatever is 
worshipful also subject to thought. (8.627) 
From the sixteenth century we have derived the custom of determining 
which experiences are relevant for the investigation of natural phenomena. 
The scientists of that time were wise enough to realise that they were 
not concerned with the whole range of human experience. They had no need 
to be, nor could they be. On.the other hand, we have inherited, from 
their insistenc~ that sense-experiences were the sole clues to objectivity, 
a deep suspicion about the validity of all non-scientific claims to knowledge. 
This is a point made, and deplored, by Whitehead. He expresses himself 
strongly to the effect that 'knowledge is not limited to verified percept-
ions drawn from reflection upon a particular slice of sense-data alone, 
but upon the whole range of human experience'. (6.389) 
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The structure of scientific thought is built upon that proper 
methodology which isolates small areas of experience, or evidence, for 
investigation. Whitehead concedes this; but he stresses, at the same 
time, the danger of making 'an arbitrary halt at a particular set of 
abstractions' lest it lead to the neglect of knowledge in the realm 
of values and spirit. A dogmatic assurance that nothing worth knowing 
lies outside the data derived from the senses is unjustified. (see 6.390) 
Magee continues this line of thought when he says that, as we contemplate 
our experiences we derive different 'bodies of knowledge' depending on 
the kind of experience we are thinking about. One is appropriate to 
social science, another to physics, another to ethics or aesthetics, and 
still another to the kind of experience we designate religious. 
Magee quotes Hume's classic statement 'If we take in hand any volume ••. 
let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning ••.. any experimental 
reasoning ...•• No? Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing 
but sophistry and illusion' as being typical of the kind of thinking which 
Whitehead criticises because, although Hume was here inveighing against 
theology (as being restrictive of free enquiry), his words proved to be 
a foundation-stone for that positivistic philosophy which has, in its 
turn, provided 'an arbitrary restriction against looking at the possible 
meaning in wider reaches of experience. It is, in short, too much a priori 
and too little empirical'.(6.391) It involves, moreover, the jettisoning 
of beliefs about objective moral standards, or God, or freedom, or 
immortality. (7) 
We have derived our concepts of determinism and order, so far as 
science is concerned, because of the scientific method which limits 
investigation to prescribed areas. This does not apply in nature, or in 
'real life'.. What laws have been discovered in laboratories apply outside 
those laboratories, of course; but in addition.there is that host of 
chance events and accidental combinations which make up life as we 
experience it. It is these chances and accidents which are usually 
decisive; for by them we are forced into existential situations which 
lead to acts of choice which, in their turn, may well be the first moves 
in a rational process. Credo ut intelligam. One notices increasing 
references to 'tendency' and 'probability' in scientific discourse. It 
would not be altogether naive to suggest that this was indicative of a 
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recognition of the validity of this principle. 
We have no right to make religious capital out of this situation 
by, for example, moving out from it to say that therefore there is a 
transcendent purpose, or a supernatural influence, at work. We need to· 
keep in mind, however, that 'scientific explanation' is coming up against 
barriers which would have been, half-a-century ago, thought to have been 
thrown down for ever. 
We may say then that there are several types of knowledge which are 
plausible even if they do not satisfy the strict truth-claims which are 
appropriate to scientific method, or agree with the out-and-out empiricism 
of Hume. Yet all of them arise from experiences which have been submitted 
to the process of reflection or contemplation. Authentic religious 
knowledge results from reflection upon spiritual experiences; and these 
can be identified because it is in their nature to elicit response and 
conviction, and not simply recognition and assent. This is probably 
what M.C.V. Jeffreys had in mind when he wrote 'Religious experience is 
normal experience understood at full depth'. 
Some things we know, and we know them very well; but we do not know 
everything. This applies to humanity at large as much as to any individual 
member of it. An education which has a religious quality about it should 
preserve us from that intellectual lethargy and pride which is engendered 
by any sense of dogmatic finality. There are some areas about which it 
is best to take note of what Kierkegaard wrote in his JOURNALS ...• that 
there comes a point when it is important to understand that one cannot 
understand further. In similar mood Wittgenstein said that values 'make 
themselves manifest', they do not arise out of facts. 
I believe with Jeffreys that it must be acknowledged that, although 
religious knowledge comes from religious data, "these data are not separate 
from our 'ordinary' experience. They spring from a particular way of 
looking at experience. It is hardly possible to be more explicit than 
that. Authentic religious experience (so many would insist) itself 
supplies the unequivocal evidence. It is self-authenticating. Otto Strunk, Jr 
puts it another way when he writes that religion is only religion when 
the perceiver perceives it as such!' (Religion - a Psychological Inter-
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pretation, p.24). A similar point is made by Hirst on p.184 of his 
Knowledge and the Curriculum. 
This is, no doubt, an assertion which could be dismissed as altogether 
too speculative, drawing whatever justification it might have from an 
outmoded ontology. Be that as it may, an illustration of what it implies 
could be taken from Whitehead who 'in opposition to the mechanistic view 
of classical physics, proposed a view of the world as alive and responsive'. 
(6.435 and Note 7) I should wish to interpret this as being a 'free' 
rather than a 'loose' expression of a concept. In other words Whitehead 
saw in dogmatism and credal statements threats to that freedom which he 
held to be essential for mental activity and speculative enquiry. This 
applies to religious thought as well as to every other field of mental 
experience. If naturalism (which, according to Holmes, 'calls some of 
the objects of speculation derogatory names' (8.627) on the one hand, would 
admit for consideration only those objects which were known to science, 
dogmatic supernaturalism would, on the other hand, rule out further thought 
about them. In this way they conspire against broad speculative enquiry; 
and,by thus denying to the human soul access to 'the universal scope of 
things' do education great disservice. We shall, then, expect Whitehead's 
interpretation of 'religion' to be unorthodox in terms of conventional 
formulations, but that it will make generous provision for speculation. 
A similar comment could be applied to his interpretation of 'education' .. 
which, as Holmes says(B.628) 'can take its cue from speculative thought 
or from some type of thinking of more limited character'. And he quotes 
Whitehead (in The Function of Reason) in this way 
Thus when •.• a novel speculation is produced, a threefold 
problem is set. Some special science, the cosmological 
scheme, and the novel concept will have points of agree-
ment and points of variance. Reason intervenes in the 
capacity of arbiter, and yet with a further exercise of 
specu~ation. The science is modified, the cosmological 
outlook is modified, and the novel concept is modified. 
The joint discipline has eliminated elements of folly, or 
of mere omission, from all three. The purposes of man-
kind receive the consequential modification, and the 
shock is transmitted through the whole sociological 
structure of methods and institutions. 
This idea must have educational consequences. To put it directly, 
Whitehead wanted people who were able to undertake the high discipline of 
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speculative thinking to engage actively in this constructive work, and 
to demonstrate in this way the vast resources of the human mind. He 
believed that, as a result of this, the majority, the multitude, even 
though neither philosophically inclined nor competent, would live 
tolerantly and hopefully. In short he invested the word 'speculation' 
with a richness of meaning indicative of his respect both for that 
mental process, and for persons. 
He was a great advocate of tolerance, and he traced it back 'as a 
requisite for high civilization' to 'the speech of Pericles as reported 
by Thucydides. It puts forth the conception of an' organised society 
successfully preserving freedom of behaviour for its individual members'. 
We have a hint of his special polarization as regards religion when we 
learn that he would have liked to replace the New Testament book of the 
Revelation of St. John the Divine with that selfsame speech of Pericles! 
But although Whitehead looked for tolerance and the exercise of 
liberty, he recognised that social life, in school as well as in society 
at large, was impossible without discipline; and said 'it follows that a 
doctrine as to the social mingling of liberty and compulsion is required'. 
The way he hoped to achieve this was through well-defined professional 
bodies, legal institutions, sovereign states - anywhere in which the 
propriety of actions had to be judged; and then, on the strength of that 
judgement, permission had to be given for their performance, or withheld. 
By way of illustration of this principle he referred to the 
notorious Scopes Trial: 
The State of Tennessee did not err in upholding the 
principle that there are limits to the freedom of 
teaching in schools and colleges. But it exhibited 
a gross ignorance of its proper £unctions when it 
defied a professional opinion which throughout the 
world is practically unanimous. 
One feels that Whitehead would have been perturbed by politically 
inspired intervention (and that of minority groups) in the field of 
education - not least in religious education - of which intervention 
there is so much today. (9) He saw education, its organisation, its 
practice, and its government, almost as a social and professional enclave; 
and he was against teachers allying themselves with unions, political parties, 
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churches or sects. Yet this was not narrowness. He believed that there 
should be many independent societies within society, each contributing its 
part towards the welfare of the whole. (10) He saw developing a gradual 
movement within a world-society in which all men would exercise overall 
control in a democratic way, but in which also government of this part 
or that would be in the hands of competent professionals. It was essential 
for these leaders to be educated for their specific tasks. This Platonic 
ideal is reinforced by Whitehead's own ideas on education, and goes some 
distance towards showing why he thought it should have a religious character. 
Also, although education was to be broadly based, as it were, it was also 
to have a selective quality with a strong vocational aspect. In spite 
of his classical background •.• or, possibly, because of it? .•• he had a 
special interest in technical education. This, no doubt, is one reason 
why he gave support to the Harvard Business School ('One of the oldest 
of the arts, the newest of the professions') (11) He might have been 
expected, as a follower of the aristocratic Greek philosophers, to have 
had reservations about the place of 'the workers' in society. His over-
riding attitude of tolerance and equity, however, would have nullified any 
such outlook. 
It is a common experience when reading Whitehead to find one's eyes 
lifted from the page to the horizon, as it were. This is because his 
writing is so free and lively that even short paragraphs will often contain 
a stimulating selection of concepts. The obscurity of his writing may 
sometimes baffle us; but his remarkable insights quicken our attention. 
In illustration of this I submit for comment four passages taken from the 
chapter by Holmes in Volume Three (p.635 ff) of The Library of Living 
Philosophers; that volume which is given over to the life and thought of 
Whitehead. He is writing of his subject's educational philosophy, and 
makes this summary; 
1. The Living Process of Education. 'Education ceases, denies its own 
ends and its essential nature, rots what it should keep alive and sweet 
the moment it forgets that children are living, growing, active organisms 
making their own way into a world whose only valid meanings are achieved 
within the living present'. 
2. The Living Utility of Education. 'Education bE·comes and remains a 
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living process, and it has personal and national importance, only as it 
is useful in some way at every point in personal growth and only as it 
eventuates in specialized power, cons·cious of its own inherently demanded 
style, in a form of work which is socially valuable'~ 
3. The Living Rhythm of Education. 'Education must take account of 
the periodic character of growth, and the rise and fall of energy in 
interest and power of attention, and of the balance between the need for 
immediacy of active understanding and the need for grasp of the external 
and unyielding essentials both of the organized thought to be mastered and 
the social demands to be met', 
4. The Living Quality of Final Educational Ends. 'The ultimate ends of 
education are living religion, living aesthetic enjoyment, and a living 
courage which urges men towards new creative adventure'. 
In these four points Holmes brings out some of the more important 
aspects of Whitehead's theories of education; and, although he is speaking 
about education as such, obviously there must be brought into the discussion 
a consideration of subjects to be studied, the reason for their inclusion, 
and the methods by which they are to be taught. 
So then from 1, we deduce that Whitehead believed in self-motivated 
activity as a basis for education. Although 'the present moment' is of 
great importance to the child, Whitehead is against pottering or tinkering. 
A school-room project, for example, is to be different in quality and in 
depth from a home-backyard project! It must also be wider, and better 
informed, as well as being based upon connected ideas constructively 
employed. Inert ideas (by which he means ideas which are not incorporated 
into a structure.of usefulness and fertility. Mere 'knowing that' is of 
little worth unless it is linked with 'knowing how' and 'knowing what 
for'. How Aristotelean!) and scraps of information have nothing to do 
with real education. (12.59) As fo~ the present moment as such, this 
has ethi~al significance as well as temporal. It has meaning in itself; 
if otherwise, then neither the future nor the past has meaning. Any value 
(e.g. happiness, fulfilment) which always lies in the future cannot answer 
our expectation of what genuine values should be. To live for the future, 
or in the past, is to rob the present of meaning. If life has meaning, then 
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it has it here and now; and Whitehead stressed this. The educational 
significance of this position is that an education wtich is essentially 
future-directed must come under criticism. And, of course, the Judeo-
Christian religion, with which our educational system has so many intimate 
links, has fallen under similar criticism often enough. 
From 2, we derive a corrective against any idea that utility in 
learning (that is, learning useful things) is base or mean. Whitehead 
was very aware that a period of about ten years was so short a time in 
which educators had the opportunity to mould, influence, or liberate the 
child. The kind of environment in which children find themselves now 
demands that they be taught to do things, to prepare to make a living, and 
to learn how to contribute to their society. That is why Whitehead 
approved so strongly of technical education (thereby departing from the 
classical Greek pattern) - provided it was not separated from science or 
art. 
There can be no doubt that Whitehead had a coherent philosophy of 
education appropriate for the gifted child; but he had little to say 
about the less-gifted, or the handicapped. He did not regard technical 
education, however, as a lower-grade education or activity suitable only 
for those who were not equipped to profit from the higher grades. Those 
who, like R. Williams in The Long Revolution, see three contributory 
factors emerging from the nineteenth-century debate on education (viz. 
education as a natural right; as a means of economic efficiency; or as 
a liberal or humane policy, but not a vocational training) might see 
Whitehead as setting-off the first against the second, perhaps; and only 
partly agreeing with the third. The debate about the difference between 
'equality of opportunity' and 'social equality' is more vigorous now 
than it was thirty or forty years ago. 
From 3, we learn something about the constant interplay of freedom 
and authority. They are not two different things, to be injected, so to 
speak, into the pupil at different moments as circumstances dictate. 
The object of this interplay seems to be to achieve what Whitehead himself 
described in Symbolics, Its Meaning and Effect, and summarised in the final 
paragraph of that book. 
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Free men obey the rules they themselves have made ••••• 
the art of free society consists first in the maintenance 
of the symbolic codes; and secondly in the fearlessness 
of revision, to secure that the code serves those purposes 
which satisfy an enlightened reason. 
The implications of this for religious-education (as such) hardly need 
be mentioned; and Holmes comments that 'The advocates of the child-
centred school should read Whitehead. So should the advocates of a fixed 
common culture derived from the past'.(8.639) 
Section 4 introduces concepts which, though fine-sounding and generally 
intelligible, are incapable of precise definition. Whitehead's thought on 
the matter might best be shown by one of the two statements which are here 
under analysis (from The Aims of Education, p.23) 
A religious education is an education which inculcates duty 
and reverence. Duty arises from our potential control over 
the course of events. Where attainable knowledge could have 
changed the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice'. (13) 
'And the foundation of reverence is this perception, that 
the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence, 
backwards and forwards, that whole amplitude of time, which 
is eternity' .(See comment on p.50) 
If he is correct in this, then two things are of fundamental import-
ance - the gaining of knowledge, and the understanding of what knowledge 
is. This is for every person to discover for himself; but, unaided, he 
will not progress along this particular road as far as he could, or has 
need to; for he will have to acquire techniques for the first part and a 
set of values for the second. His attitude to life will be guided socially, 
but decided individually. 
Which brings Whitehead to the consideration of the responsibility of 
the teacher. The position he adopts in the two final sentences of the 
next quotation is of importance to our understanding of what he meant 
~hen he linked education with religion. The whole passage provides an 
illustration of my earlier comment on the way Whitehead's writing is so 
conceptually-stimulating. 
What I am now insisting is that the principle of progress 
is from within; the discovery is made by ourselves, the 
discipline is self-discipline, and the fruition is the 
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outcome of our own initiative. 
(This might seem to favour a method of self-tuition and self-pacing. 
No doubt there is merit in that system; and no doubt every student 
makes use of it to a greater or lesser extent. But observe how Whitehead 
continues) . 
The teacher has a double function. It is for him to elicit 
the enthusiasm by resonance from his own personality, and 
to create the environment of a larger knowledge and a firmer 
purpose. He is there to avoid the waste, which in the lower 
stages of existence is nature's way of evolution. The ultimate 
motive power, alike in science, in morality, and religion, is 
the sense of value, the sense of importance. 
It takes the various forms of wonder, of curiosity, of 
reverence, of worship, of tumultuous desire for merging 
personality in something beyond itself. This sense of value 
imposes on life incredible labours, and, apart from it, life 
sinks back into the passivity of its lower types. The most 
penetrating exhibition of this force is the sense of beauty, 
the aesthetic sense of realized perfection. This thought 
leads me to ask, whether in our modern education we emphasise 
sufficiently the function of art'. (14.62) 
By 'art' we are to understand the whole aesthetic impetus; and the 
teacher, one might almost say, has the awesome responsibility of showing 
the pupil the sacredness of the present moment, even when it is not beaut-
iful. This suggests that he have some appreciation of ends, purposes, and 
values to which he feels compelled to introduce his pupils. And this is 
an aesthetic in itself. 
In reading Whitehead one cannot be for long unaware of his pre-
occupation with the aesthetic. Even in mathematics he was impressed by 
the beauty of form as much as by the beauty of meaning. Being fundament-
ally religious he said that, for him, mathematics was 'the language of 
divinity'; and for much of his later life he devoted himself to the study 
of ways in which science, religion, mathematics, and philosophy impinged 
on each other. His concern for the mathematical type of scientific know-
ledge rather than the empirical reveals, needless to say, the Platonist. 
Or even the Pythagorean! 
Yet in his admiration for the classical, and his constant return to 
,;, 
the modes and styles of the past, he was no reactionary or ultra-conservative. 
In his book The Modes of Thought he maintained that 'the closed system is 
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the death of living understanding'. He was writing there of the relation-
ship of mathematics to the Good; but he showed, in the context of that 
statement, his belief both that the understanding of structure and system 
was essential for rational thought, and also that process was fundamental 
to his philosophy. It is not easy to see how the concepts of structure, 
system, and process apply in aesthetics; but Whitehead the mathematician 
would surely have looked for elegance of style as a sine qua non of beauty. 
Style he describes as 'the ultimate morality of mind'. 
Now elegance, appropriateness, beauty itself, are functions of 
specific environments both of time and place. If this is indeed so, this 
helps us to understand why Whitehead could not agree with any educational 
method which was essentially static, least of all in religion. 
Static doctrine must be offered, of course, as one of the ways in 
which the phenomenon of religion has presented itself. "The faith, once 
delivered to the saints" means much to many people. So much, in fact, 
that marked deviation from that standard is interpreted as heresy or 
apostasy. However, the growing belief would now seem to be that whatever 
spirit or dynamic guided the powers of religious (or supra-rational} 
thought in the past continues to work today. We learn; we grow; we 
discover. And we can still uphold this belief without falling inevitably 
into the trap of evolutionary perfectionism. To think along these lines 
offers more hopeful prospects than those which are associated with static 
form. 
We might surmise, in extension of this idea, that any sort of 
education which is closed, or static, or given as the last word, cannot 
be religious. Doctrine must live and breathe. Where it is found to be 
true (in a pragmatic sense}, or meaningful, it must be transmitted. 
Awareness of this, together with the understandtng that all ultimate 
explanations are given in terms of values, will help us to interpret 
Whitehead's views on education. 
; 
It must be observed, however, that although Whitehead's views them-
selves underwent a constant process of modification, yet they rested all 
the time on one solid foundation. He believed that a world without value 
is a world without meaning. In order for science to be possible, and 
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scientific method to be valid, there must be more in the world than 
science is prepared to admit .... an element of meaning, in fact. 
Whitehead seems to equate this meaning with value. We base our decisions 
on ultimate explanations and values; and we have there the nexus of 
religion and education. 
In sum, that education should be religious, implies (in the most 
general of terms) that it is something which leads to the divine prin-
ciple of the universe - to which we need give no specific name - and 
to human conduct which is consistent with some ethical norm, and to an 
attitude towards oneself such as is consistent with the notion that 
religious education is to do with duty and reverence. 
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Notes to Section Four 
1. Hamley, H.R. in Education for Complete Living, ed. Cunningham and 
Radford, A.C.E.R., 1938, p.605, writes 
As Professor Whitehead has said - "The nation preserves 
its vigour so long as it harbours a real contrast between 
what has been and what may be; and so long as it is 
nerved by the vigour to adventure beyond the safeties 
of the past. Without adventure civilization is full 
of decay. - Only the adventurous can understand the 
greatness of the past". Adventure is a departure from 
the safe ground of security, not in search of record 
or novelty, but in search of new securities and perfect-
ions. If security is the condition, then adventure is 
the agency of all growth and development. 
2. Anshea, R.N. (ed.), Alfred North Whitehead, His Reflections upon 
Man and Nature, Harper and Row, 1961 
Whitehead insists, as opposed to Descartes, that feeling 
comes before thought or bare existence that we are aware 
of. I find myself rather essentially a unit of emotions, 
of enjoyment, of hope, of fears, of regrets, valuations 
of alternatives ..• all of these are my subjective react-
ions to my environment as I am active in my nature. My 
unity which is Descartes "I am" is my process of shaping 
the welter of material into a consistent pattern of 
feelings. 
3. For the significance of 'erotic' etc. in this connection, see, 
for example, Simone Weil 1 s Intimations of Christianity Among the 
Ancient Greeks. And see 5. below. 
4. See my note on the Summary of the Black Papers 1975; Appendix. 
5. "Classics for Whitehead, the humanist, is Latin, which is a pity; 
more especially as Whitehead, the scientist, appeals entirely to 
Greek". Gibson, A. Boyce, Melbourne Studies in Education, 1965, 
p.30. 
6. Magree, J.B., Religion and Modern Man, Harper and Row, 1967. 
7. That demonstrative proof is not the only kind of rational justifica-
tion of a belief is a point of view which was examplified in Kant 1 s 
postulation of God, freedom, and immortality. In his Preface to the 
Critique of Pure Reason he says 
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Accidental observations, made in obedience to no previously 
thought-out plan, can never be made to yield a necessary 
law, which alone reason is concerned to discover. Reason, 
holding in one hand its principles, according to which 
alone concordant appearances can be admitted as equivalent 
to laws, and in the other hand the experiment which it 
has devised in conformity with these principles, must approach 
nature in order to be taught by it. It must not, however, do 
so in the character of a pupil, who listens to everything 
that the teacher chooses to say, but of an appointed judge, 
who compels witnesses to answer questions he himself has 
formulated ••• It is thus that the study of nature has 
entered on the secure path of science, after having for so 
many centuries been nothing but a process of merely random 
groping. 
An interesting side-light on Whitehead is to be found as a footnote 
to p.212 of The Organisation Man, by Wm. H. Whyte, Pelican, 1965. 
'Speaking to his friend, Lucien Price, A.N.W. recalled how, in the 
1880's in Cambridge, nearly everything was supposed to be known 
about physics that could be known, and, like others, he thought it 
was an almost closed subject. "By the middle of the 1890's" he 
said "there were a few tremors, a slight shiver as of all not being 
quite secure, but no one sensed what was coming. By 1900 Newtonian 
physics were demolished. Done for! Still speaking personally, it 
had a profound effect on me: I have been fooled once, and I'll be 
damned if I'll be fooled again"' 
8. Volume Three, The Library of Living Philosophers (Whitehead) 
Northwestern University, 1941. 
9. Whitehead would have shared that nervousness about the role of the 
State in education which J.S. Mill expressed in his Essay on Liberty. 
In a very real sense a Minister for Education can be the most powerful 
officer in a government. 'That the whole or any large part of the 
education of the people should be in State hands, I go as far as 
anyone in deprecating ••• An education established and controlled by 
the State should only exist, if it exists at all, as one among many 
competing experiments ••• ' 
10. Perhaps Whitehead's early upbringing, which would certainly have given 
him an acquaintance with the ideals of mutual service as set out by 
St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 12, as well as with the universalism of the 
Stoics, had something to do with this point of view? 
11. 
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'The English academic who has been brought up on Newman's 
Idea of a University feels a certain dreariness of spirit, 
as Matthew Arnold used to say, when he sees the great 
University of Harvard launching out into an inunense and 
imposing Business faculty. And he laughs sarcastically 
when he learns that certain American universities give 
degrees and diplomas in horticulture - etc. The Englishman, 
nevertheless, is wrong •• Even (Oxford and Cambridge) are 
finding that they have to compromise with new ways, and a 
new country inevitably starts with them'. 
J.A. Spender in Through English Eyes quoted in Cunningham and 
Radford's Education for Complete Living. This was written in 1935! 
12. White, J.P., Towards a Compulsory Curriculum, R.K.P., 1973. 
13. 'Faith has no merit where human reason provides the 
proof' - Gregory the Great. 
14. Whitehead, A.N., The Aims of Education and other Essays, Ernest Benn, 
1962. 
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Section Five 
Whitehead and Religion 
"No view of education is adequate which does not reckon with spiritual 
conflict as man's particular heritage. Man's supreme problem is to find 
reconciliation through and beyond the conflict" - M.C.V. Jeffreys in 
The Aims of Education. 
This section provides a further analysis of Whitehead's conception 
of religion. In the course of it I shall refer to his philosophy of science, 
though not with the intention of making any detailed survey of his scientific 
doctrines. In a discussion of the relationship between education and 
religion, reference has to be made to scientific method, and the relevant 
epistemology, because of the major part this had to play in our educational 
systems and methods. My contention will be that there is also a religious 
epistemology which, given certain rules or frames of reference, can be 
validated. 
Whereas scientific thinking proceeds along the well-ordered lines of 
structure, quantity, and causation, and interprets the universe in ways 
which are amenable to these conditions, religion, and axiological thought 
in general, interprets the universe in ways for which the questions Why? 
or Wherefore? are appropriate. This suggests that 'meaning' or 'purpose' 
must be taken into account; and the universe will then be interpreted 
according to teleological principles or criteria. 
This notion of teleology provides the theme for this section, and it 
also represents the thread which runs through all those eclectic elements 
which constitute Whitehead's theory of education insofar as he relates 
it to religion. It is clear that he would not have given to 'religion' 
a meaning such as 'that which is dogmatic and church-centred'. It is 
equally clear that he would not have considered reductionist theories 
(which would subsume religion under alternative headings such as ethics, 
literature, human relations, art, or social studies) as adequate, either. 
Of one thing we might be fairly certain: if he could give conviction 
to the idea that 'the essence of education is that it be religious', then 
he must at least have considered religion to be an integrative force, 
comprehensive rather than sectional. 
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In an article on religious instruction Brian Hill maintains that in 
a 'pluralistic democracy' an educational system should reflect both the 
characteristics and the requirements of pluralism whilst being, at the 
same time, democratic. He means by this simply that our schools have a 
responsibility to initiate every student into the forms of thought and 
experience which are typical of what we understand to be civilized life. 
Unless this process occurs, the pupil is neither aware of the options 
available to him, nor is he in a position to make sensible use of his 
ri~hts of free choice. 
To achieve this desirable end, however, Hill says that 'a fair amount 
of benign compulsion' must be incorporated into the curriculum for the 
child's formative years. 'There are certain things we believe the child 
must know in order not only to survive but to develop a life-style which 
is socially viable and personally satisfying'. (1.38) This sentiment is 
consistent with Whitehead's educational aims as set out, for example, in 
the first five chapters of his Aims of Education. Can it throw light on 
what he meant by, education-that-is-religious? 
Whitehead does not make the enquiry any the easier when he reminds 
us that 'there is no agreement as to the definition of religion in its most 
general sense'. There is, indeed, a broad spectrum of types of religion 
which extends from humanism at one end to transcendent theism at the 
other. His statement about the religious quality of education cannot 
therefore be taken as it stands unless we know what kind of religion he 
was referring to. One clue might be found in this - that whereas humanism 
must be ultimately pessimistic (cf. H.G. Wells' The Mind at the End of its 
Tether, or Hepburn's Objections to Humanism, or Russell's 'firm foundation 
of unyielding despair'), Whitehead was essentially optimistic. 
He was convinced, moreover, that religion must not be treated as if it 
were but one aspect of the social sciences. He said, for example, 'you 
use arithmetic, "but you are religious .•. Your character is developed 
according to your faith. This is the primary religious truth from which no 
one can escape. In the long run your character and your conduct of life 
depend upon your ultimate convictions'.(2.5) 
The previous paragraph raises the problem which is integral to any 
discussion about religious education as such. It is commonly said, 'for 
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example, (and even by those who would be most reluctant to have religious 
instruction in state schools) that teaching about religion is in order. 
The implication is that such teaching could be given if it were taken 
to be a particular aspect of social science, and suitable therefore for 
field research, statistical analysis, and so on. Whitehead sees, however, 
that this would be not only inadequate but also inconsistent with the true 
character of the subject being studied. Although religious education must 
be as objective as possible, and those who teach it scrupulous in their 
intention to guard against indoctrinating, we must always bear in mind 
that religion is the name for that which is more than a phenomenon. It 
is an experience; and, as such, it produces in those who study it acts of 
decision or commitment, for it or against it. 
This must be said; for although increasing attention is being given 
to the academic study of religion, 'religion' has become an end in itself. 
Thus God tends now to be but one topic in the wider study which is religion; 
whereas God himself was once the object of worship, and 'religion' was the 
method and the matter by which it was done. There is noticeable, in 
contemporary discussion which is to do with the God-concept, a general 
shift in emphasis from static structure and unchanging categories to process; 
in ethics, from formal principles to contexts; and in the religious life, 
from repressive elements to expressive. 
Whitehead describes religion as 'the art and theory of the internal 
life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is perm-
anent in the nature of things'. If this is so, then it negates the 
theory that religion is primarily a social fact; because social facts are 
by no means always of a permanent character. In that respect they contrast 
with the archetypal constituents in our human nature. Religion could be 
described, indeed, as the controlled use of archetypal myths ••. a myth 
being that which provides a unifying framework for those symbols which 
are used in the form of a narrative. 
This is not to say that social facts are of no importance in religion, 
or to the study of religion; for 'no man is all island'. As Whitehead puts 
it 'you cannot abstract society from man, and most psychology is herd-
psychology. But all collective emotions leave untouched the awful ult-
imate fact, which is the human being consciously alone with itself, for 
its own sake. Religion is what the individual does with his own solitari-
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ness' .(2.6) That last sentence is one of the best-known definitions of 
religion; and it is regrettable that advocates of religion in its more 
corporate aspects so often quote it out of context and without reference 
to what is said immediately before and after it. 
Whitehead did not mean by it that the ideal form of religion is 
self-contemplation; even though he must have been aware that 'the unexamined 
life is not worth living'. Without question, self-scrutiny is one of the 
higher planes in all the great religions, not excluding those in which the 
doctrine of 'salvation by saviour' is central. 
But Whitehead did not abstract man from his heritage and environment 
in order to find him in the act of bein~ religious! He always saw religion 
as existing in the context of civilization, as existing, that is to say, 
in community of faith or practice. He could never have agreed with those 
who tried to interpret his definition as meaning that the religious phen-
omenon could be understood in complete separation from social and environ-
mental factors. 
Whitehead looks to standards of reference external to the self with 
which contrasts and comparisons can be made. The most important of these 
{because the most comprehensive) he designates as God. God provides a 
transcendent point of reference for the here-and-now events of daily life. 
The religious function in man addresses itself to the problem of the 
meaning of existence in the light of God's will or purpose - however 
'God' may be interpreted. 
But here is a trap for the unwary! Whitehead does not mean by God 
the person we learn abont at mother's knee. He regards God as a cosmic 
artist who constantly {or eternally) imposes his ideas on the chaos of 
space and the disorder of motion. He derived this artistic concept of 
the creative God almost certainly from Plato, who had developed it in 
the Timaeus and· the Philebus. The chaos and the disorder are, however, 
external to God; and so we have a theological dualism. God: and that 
upon which God works and expresses himself. Whitehead says that the 
basic assumption in modern science is a widespread instinctive conviction 
in the existence of an Order of Things; and, in particular, of an Order 
of Nature. (3) 
-63-
This is, of course, a primal assumption in nearly all the major religions, 
and certainly of those which have a semitic origin (the Revealed Trio -
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). Whitehead sees "What do you mean by 
God?" as a fundamental question, and he describes three sorts of answer 
to it (2.56/7), with one or other of which a religious outlook would 
align itself. 
(a) The Eastern Asiatic conception of the impersonal order to 
which the world conforms, 
(b) The Semitic concept of a definite personal individual 
entity, 
(c) The Pantheistic concept which, as an extreme monism, 
identifies the world's reality with that of God. 
He assures us, however, that Christianity has not adopted any one 
of these clear alternatives because 'it has been true to its genius for 
keeping its metaphysics subordinate to the religious facts to which it 
appeals' .(2.60) and (4) Nonetheless, the Christian doctrine of creation 
is that of simple divine fiat, ex nihilo. 
Dorothy Emmet, who has done so much to advance the study of Whitehead's 
philosophy, wrotP- that 'faith is distinguished from that entertainment of 
a probable proposition by the fact that the latter can be a completely 
theoretic affair. Faith is a Yes of self-commitment: it does not turn 
probabilities into certainties; only a sufficient weight of evidence could 
do that. But it is a volitional response which takes us out of the theoretic 
attitude'. (5.140) 
This is so; and in all fairness it has to be admitted that it could 
cause anxiety to educational theorists who are determined to preserve 
neutrality at all costs, lest the moral integrity of the pupils be tamp-
ered with. Pr~ctical pedagogic necessity, on the other hand, suggests that 
this cannot be taken too seriously. A pupil who moved out of his schooldays 
without 'formed attitudes' (for which his teachers will be, in part, 
responsible) could hardly be considered educated: and, quite obviously, 
not every pupil will hold the same set of attitudes as every other pupil. 
This will be seen most distinctly in the axiological areas ••• not least 
in that of religion. Yet Whitehead could say that the essence of education 
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is that it be religious! This is perhaps an expression of one of his 
fundamental ideas - that we do not reach every decision as the result of 
rational exercise, even if we were able to. 
Now as it is not of the substance of this dissertation, I propose not 
to examine the matter too closely, and am prepared to accept what John Hick 
in his Philosophy of Religion takes as a starting point. He holds Descartes 
responsible for the view that we can only know truths that are self-evident, 
or those that can be reached by logical inference from self-evident premises. 
Even though this allows no place for intuition or revelation, it is a view 
which forms, I imagine, the opinion of the majority. In other words, the 
popular view is that 'to know' means 'to be able to prove' ••• and this is 
a legacy of the Cartesian tradition. But as Kant told us 'concepts without 
factual content are empty; sense data without concepts are blind •.• The 
understanding cannot see. The sense cannot think. By their union only 
can knowledge be produced'. And it took G.E. Moore to formulate the opinion 
that what many people suspect (and all people live by!) is that that 
Cartesian tradition is irrational rather than rational. Nothing can, in 
truth, be more certain than the reality of our physical environment. We 
need only to accept it, not to justify it philosophically. As we have 
seen already Whitehead also had strong views on this question of 'world 
acceptance' • ( 6) 
But in the 19th century the ancient struggle between the rationalists 
and the empiricists (in which the Christian religion, in spite of its 
existentialist character, was necessarily involved) took on a new form 
which might be described as Organism versus Atomism. One result of this 
was that Russell and Whitehead, who had co-operated so fruitfully in 
Principia Mathematica, later drew apart; the one to become a logical atomist, 
and the other a philosopher of organism. 
That Whitehead brought out two of his most important books (Science and 
the Modern World and Process and Reality) when he was 63 and 68 respect-
ively has led some critics to suggest that he was then past his best; 
implying, presumably, that those two books should not be regarded as 
representative of his finest and most fruitful work. Yet is is reasonable 
to believe that we are now in the position of being required to choose 
between the type of philosophy represented by the later Whitehead and that 
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represented by Russell. (I refer back to the comments of Professor 
A. Boyce Gibson in the introductory section of this dissertation) • Each 
type has important consequences for the interpretation both of religion 
and of education. 
For Whitehead, speculative philosophy is an endeavour to provide a 
set of ideas in terms of which everything we experience can be interpreted. 
It will not do to interpret one experience by one 'set' and another experience 
by another 'set'; the metaphysical set is meant to provide a consistent 
and comprehensive interpretation of the world-process as a whole. Whitehead 
believed that everything of which we were conscious - as enjoyed, perceived, 
willed, or thought - should have the character of a particular instance 
in the general scheme; and his views on morals, religion, politics, and 
history are derived directly from his metaphysical position. Though he 
developed no metaphysical system which he would have considered to be 
final, he did look for general ideas by which to interpret 'all the choir 
of heaven and the furniture of earth'. When Berkeley wrote those quoted 
words he was referring to 'the mind of some Eternal Spirit' which sustained 
all things in those moments when they did not happen to be perceived by 
human minds. Whitehead was equally aware of some Eternal Spirit. 
He realised that we start in philosophy from what we find our normal 
experience to be like; and that we must therefore be suspicious of any 
theory which would require us to disregard our normal perceptual experience. 
Berkeley himself was, let it be said, giving symbolic expression to the 
remarkable way our perceptual experiences fit-in together, both within 
the experience of any one individual, and that of others. In this way 
there is induced a sense of wonder and respect which is quite likely to 
influence even our most mundane reactions to material objects. 
In view of the foregoing, it could hardly be otherwise but that 
Whitehead should speak so frequently of religious qualities and values. 
The purely scientific scheme of things, he argues, leaves some elements 
out. Thus, a frankly mechanical outlook on the universe is possible only 
if we are prepared to treat the abstractions of physical science as if 
they were concrete elements of experience. (7) 
Whitehead is unlike the traditional metaphysician on the one hand (for 
he nowhere claimed that his own theories were final) , and the traditional 
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subjectivist on the other. He was a realist who would not accept that 
experience must be conceived subjectively. This is what lies behind 
his statement about 'qualities' in nature. That they have a reality 
of their own he expressed in that well-known irony, 
Thus the bodies are conceived as with qualities which 
in reality do not belong to them, qualities which in 
fact are purely the offspring of the mind. Thus nature 
gets the credit which should in truth be reserved for 
ourselves; the rose for its scent, the nightingale for 
his song; and the sun for its radiance. The poets are 
entirely mistaken. They should address their lyrics 
to themselves, and should turn them into odes of 
self-congratulation on the excellency of the human 
mind. Nature is a dull affair, soundless, colourless; 
merely the hurrying of material, endlessly, meaningless-
ly. (8.68) 
However that may be,the fact remains that, out of an infinite 
variety of possible worlds (the hypothesis is not unthinkable) what has 
arisen is this actual world-type with which we are familiar. (9) It 
could be said perhaps that it is the 'excellent human mind' which provides 
the ordering principle to account for this fact; but, as we have seen, 
) 
Whitehead attributed it rather to God, whom he described as 'the principl~ 
of concretion' . 
At first sight this is unexceptionable. God can be given many 
descriptive titles with some measure of justification. It is when he is 
deprived of them that offence is more likely to be caused in the minds and 
hearts of those who worship hiin. (If Whitehead had denied explicitly 
that God was the Creator, for example). Yet his ideas of God proved to be 
as unwelcome to many orthodox theologians as some of his philosophical 
ideas proved to be unwelcome to philosophers of traditional outlook. He 
did not think of God as static, passive, or 'deistic'; but, instead, as 
'in process'. God is involved, that is to say,· in the Creation of which 
he was and is the author ••• though managing to avoid the intellectual 
problems which are inherent in the twin doctrines of Transcendence and 
Immanence. He is a limited God ••• though, doubtless, self-limited. This 
was the stumbling-block for orthodoxy. (10.334/5) 
For the 'process thinkers' the basic assumption that man's place must 
be set in its evolutionary context must be put alongside the conviction 
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that, in all human experience, the mental and the physical interpenetrate 
each other. For Whitehead, process rather than timeless being is the 
ultimate metaphysical truth. He argues that the traditional notion of a 
God complete in his being and beyond all change, is a self-contradicting 
idea. That it is an idea, what is more, which is as unnecessary (either 
in metaphysics or in Christian theology) as it is self-contradictory. (9) 
It is likely that Whitehead has made out as good a case as can be 
offered, at the present time, for a compromise with metaphysics. But 
to his occasional appeals to intuition and his initial assumption that 
the universe forms a necessary, coherent system, the empiricist will be 
inclined to turn a deaf ear. The detailed information supplied by 
Whitehead about the primordial, and the consequent, natures of God(lO) 
must elicit the pertinent and inevitable questions 'How do you know all 
this? How can you know it?' He might have found confirmation in some 
words of Marcus Aurelius concerning his knowledge of God. 
To those who ask the question "Where have you seen the 
gods, or whence have you apprehended that they exist, 
that you thus worship them?" First, they are visible 
even to the eyes; secondly, I have not seen my own 
soul, yet I honour it; and so too with the gods, from 
my experiences every instant of their power, from 
these I apprehend that they exist, and do them reverence. (11) 
But such an apology, which includes both an appeal to experience and 
also a cosmological reference, is not without its dangers~l0.335) Some 
would see it as not making any real sense because it requires an extra-
polation from the contingent to the non-contingent - the main objection 
to the Five Proofs of Aquinas. Perhaps, however, Whitehead's process-
philosophy steers around this difficulty; but, if it does, it is only by 
imputing to God a nature which, in contrast to the definitions of classical 
theology, is reduced. Whitehead takes the common view that 'the works of 
nature sufficiently evidence a deity'; and, as H. Hawton says, he deals 
with that basic query 'How do you know all this?' by saying that he is 
'merely trying to frame the general ideas in terms of which we can interpret 
what we experience'. He admits, nonetheless, that Whitehead, 'in the 
ardour of the quest, moves a very long way from the data of experience'.(12.152) 
This is true: he does oscillate between the testimony of the external and 
that of the internal; and he does not turn to empiricism as a full alt-
ernative. (13) 
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Whitehead says of empiricism that it depends upon the doctrine that 
there is a principle of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract 
reason; and he explains it thus, 'God is not concrete, but he is the 
ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of 
God, because that nature is the ground of rationality'. (8.222) A religious 
concern about origins, like a religious concern about the future, talks 
about God (or 'the gods', or some equivalent), and relates that talk to 
human problems. Every religion claims that there is something wrong with, 
or lacking in, human existence; and this claim might well be one of the 
criteria by which a phenomenon is identified as being 'religious'. They 
all speak, therefore, in terms of a beyond-ordinary-existence; t~ough 
they have to resort to symbols in which to express themselves. 
What further can be known about God must be sought then in the region 
of particular experiences. This does presuppose an empirical basis. In 
respect to the interpretation of these experiences the different races 
of mankind have differed widely. As a result of the enormous advances 
in knowledge, made in recent years, about the non-Christian religions, it 
no longer seems an anomaly to admit that God is known 'by a thousand names'. 
Jehovah, Allah, Brahma, Father in Heaven, First Cause, Supreme Being -
and though they are not strictly identical, every such name corresponds to 
a system of thought derived from the experience of 'the Orderer' of those 
who have used the particular name. (cf. 8.223) 
When Whitehead uses his famous phrase about the custom of 'paying 
metaphysical compliments to God' (8.250) he appears to mean that humans 
esteem God too highly! It is true that some ascriptions of praise give 
the impression of being without meaning (in any literal sense, that is •. 
though the special language of worship has received.a great deal of 
critical and scholarly attention of late, and has survived the test). 
But that this might apply in the logical sense also is the implication 
behind his statement that 'If this connection be adhered to, there can 
be no alternative except to discern in God the origin of all evil as 
well as of all good. He is the supreme author of the play, and to Him 
therefore must be ascribed its shortcomings as well as its successes'. (14) 
The fundamental nature of religious experience, though not universally 
the same in detail, is as old as mankind. But, from the 15th century 
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there was ••• a general movement of European mentality, 
which carried along with its stream, religion, science, 
and philosophy. It may shortly be characterised as being 
the direct recurrence to the original sources of Greek 
inspiration on the part of the men whose spiritual shape 
had been derived from inheritance from the Middle Ages. 
There was therefore no revival of Greek mentality. Epochs 
do not rise from the dead. The principles of aesthetics 
and reason, which animated the Greek civilization, were 
reclothed in a modern mentality. Between the two there 
lay other religions, other systems of law, other anarchies, 
and other racial inheritances, dividing the living from 
the dead. (8.173) 
It is true that, in religion, as in philosophy, there was a growth of 
subjectivism; and that whereas, before the Reformation, religious discussion 
had been concerned chiefly with matters of a strictly theological nature, 
after the Reformation the church itself was split as a result of the 
reshaping of theology in terms of individual experience. It was not enough 
to know about the doctrines of salvation; it became necessary to experience 
the effects of salvation and to be able to communicate them. Emphasis now 
lay upon the experiencing subjects. (cf. 8.173) 
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philosophy as simply providing a conceptuality in which 
the God of Christian faith can be understood in a contem-
porary way. 
11. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations XII. 28. 
12. Hawton, H., Philosophy for Pleasure,. Primer Books, 1959. 
13. A reason why has been suggested by the philosopher (of religion) 
Huston Smith, in an incidental comment which occurs in a statement 
about Jewish anthropomorphism in The Religions of Man, p.256 
It is easy to smile at the anthropomorphism of the early 
Jew who could imagine ultimate reality as a person •.• 
But when we make our way through the poetic concreteness 
of his perspective to its underlying claim - that, in the 
final analysis, reality is more like a person than a 
machine - we must ask ourselves two questions. First, 
what is the evidence against this hypothesis? It seems 
to be so completely lacking, tbat so knowledgeable a 
philosopher-scientist as Alfred North Whitehead could 
embrace it without reserve in our own generation. 
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$econd, is the concept intrinsically less exalted than 
its alternative? 
14. He is here facing a dilemma which none other than the prophet 
Isaiah faced; for in chapter 45, verse 7 of his prophecy we read 
'I (the Lord) form the light, and create darkness; I 
make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these 
things'. 
And in the Tao Te King we also read that 
'Tao is the source of all things, the treasure of good 
men, and the sustainer of bad men'. 
This can be rationalized theologically; nevertheless, the dilemma 
has been voiced. It is inescapable so long as God is thought of 
as omnipotent. This is but one of the problems which must arise 
in a God-concept which shows signs of being derived from Asiatic 
notions of absolute monarchy. It is not surprising that there have 
always been sensitive thinkers who have revolted against it. In 
this connection it is worth remarking that a metaphysical concept, 
when arraigned at the bar of religious experience, may not be able 
to present a good case. It could be in a position similar to that 
of a physical doctrine which proves incapable of meeting the facts 
of the material world as they are known to us. However, Whitehead's 
theistic doctrine of process may yet prove to be more serviceable 
and acceptable than the traditional 'world ruler' concept. 
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Section Six 
Religion, Science, and Experience 
'It were better to have no opinion of God at all, than such an 
opinion as is unworthy of him'- Francis Bacon 
Whitehead is not saying anything very revolutionary about personal 
experience as a type of knowing. But he is pointing out that, as a 
result of centuries of insistence upon the infinite worth of the individ-
ual soul, Christianity 'has superadded to the instinctive egotism of 
physical desires an instinctive feeling of justification for an intellect-
ual outlook. Every human being is the natural guardian of his own import-
ance'. (l.174) In that statement he shows his hand which he is, later on, 
to play skilfully in the game we call education. (2.18) Religion includes 
the whole man, in many and varied activities and frames of mind. It 
certainly includes the intellect, the will, and the feelings .. though no 
one to the exclusion or detriment of the other two. We may assume that 
Whitehead knew this ancient three-fold formula; and we might assume further 
that he applied it to his thinking about education. This throws a little 
light on what he had in mind when he described the essence of education 
as religious. 
Just how far the personal experience which is religion requires 
intellectual support, of necessity, is an open question; but the vast 
scale of explanation and intellectual endeavour occasioned by the concept 
of 'god' or 'God' suggests that such support is essential at any rate for 
the more thoughtful members of the human race.(3} 
Like Bergson (for whom 'process' meant creative evolution} Whitehead 
contended not only that metaphysics was a descriptive science but also 
that direct experience and intuition are basic, while proof is secondary. 
His authority for that bold statement is that the groundwork of all exist-
ence is present in all instances of existence, and hence in all experience. 
Our task is to see it there. Argument can rest only upon some part of the 
groundwork that happens to be more clearly discriminated. This suggests 
that 'clearness and distinctness' concept which is so important for the 
philosophy of knowledge. The words tend to be associated especially, if 
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not exclusively, with the scientific outlook; and that is unfortunate. 
Whitehead often refers to this situation; and I give this one example 
as typical; 
In the same way as Descartes introduced the tradition 
of thought which kept subsequent philosophy in some 
measure of contact with the scientific movement, so 
Leibniz introduced the alternative tradition that the 
entities, which are the ultimate, actual, things are 
in some sense procedures of organisation ... Kant 
reflected the two traditions, one upon the other ••. 
It should be the task of the philosophic schools of 
this century to bring together the two streams into 
an expression of the world-picture derived from 
science, and thereby end the divorce of science from 
the affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical 
experiences. (l.194) 
No writer has stressed more forcefully the divorce of science from 
the affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical experience. The signific-
ance of art and religion in the life of man is that they strive to 
restore the balanqe (or remarry the divorce) . Whitehead insists that 
the ethical and religious consciousness has as much right to be treated 
as objectively valid as have the perceptions of the external world on 
which we base our science. And anyway, no o~e really believes that the 
world is entirely without meaning and value~ 
His emphatic desire to produce, if not unity, then at least harmony, 
between the different branches of knowledge is laudable. But can the 
divorce be, in fact, avoided? Are we not confronted with two quite 
distinct categories of thought and reality which, though both legitimate, 
are incompatible? Even if the contention of equallegitimacybe granted, 
that is no guarantee that compatibility will necessarily follow. Religion 
and science are commonly thought to be in conflict because of their diff-
erent truth-claims and methodologies. We might ask a second rhetorical 
question, Is the idea of conflict 'inevitable? Whitehead maintains that 
although we have become accustomed to think that this is so, and will 
remain so unless either science or religion abandons its peculiar position, 
it is not possible that either should do so, because they are the two 
strongest powers which move us. We cannot do without the impetus given 
us either by intuition, or by careful observation along with logical 
deduction. Or, as Will Durant puts it, we have the necessity to believe 
in order to live, and the necessity to reason in order to advance. 
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The conflict between religion and science has been especially acute 
since the latter part of the nineteenth century, but it is nothing new. 
Both elements continue to develop, moreover; neither one overcoming the 
other. Whitehead, trailing his coat in the sight of the scientists, 
says that, whereas religion used to be obscurantist, science now is~ 
He declares science to be even more changeable than theology (which is 
not really surprising); though in both regions of thought additions, 
distinctions, and modifications have been introduced. It follows then 
that even if theories or doctrines which are propounded today seem to 
be similar to those which were made in the past, they are really diff-
erent because they are set in different contexts. Knowledge expands; 
meanings change. This is why Whitehead is confident that truth is rela-
tive. It can only be 'truth up to a point', there being always more to 
be discovered. All that may be taken for granted are general conceptual 
standpoints out of which truths may be formulated. 
To illustrate this he mentions the two theories about the nature of 
light; and shows how one theory is necessary to explain one group of 
phenomena, but that other phenomena can be explained only by the other 
theory. He was hopeful that, in time to come, there might be found a way 
to reconcile these two aspects of truth. This far we might agree with 
him. But I cannot agree ~ith him when he intimates that we can apply 
the same principles in the hope of similar results when we are dealing 
with the differences between science and religion. Even though they are 
working hypotheses only, both theories of light fall within the boundaries 
of science; and though bridges may be built between science and religion, 
the very need to build them implies the existence of boundaries. 
Whitehead says 
We would believe nothing in either sphere of thought 
which does not appear to us to be certified by solid 
reasons based upon the critical research either of 
ourselves or of competent authorities. But granted 
that we have honestly taken this precaution, a clash 
between the two on points of detail where they over-
lap should not lead us hastily to abandon doctrines 
for which we have solid evidence. (1.229) 
It is on the strength of that that he expects science and religion to 
show the respect to each other which is their due. He sees in the clash 
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itself an indication that both are waiting to be deepened and refined 
until at last a reconciliation between them will be possible. Science 
was guilty, he said, of drawing an arbitrary line between what it would 
accept as relevant to an interpretation of the universe, and what it would 
ignore or reject. On the one side, physical and chemical forces prove 
acceptable; on the other, aesthetic and religious forces are unacceptable. 
It is worth noting that Professor Leuba concluded his classic Psychology 
of Religious Mysticism with these words 
It is not a replacement of the religious spirit by 
science which is indicated here, but the inclusion 
into religion of the relevant scientific knowledge. 
The hope of humanity lies in a collaboration of 
religious idealism with science. 
Not everyone would agree with Whitehead, however, when he says that 
the conflict between religion and science is a slight matter of which 
too much as been made. 'A mere logical contradiction cannot in itself 
point to more than the necessity of some readjustments possibly of a 
very minor character, on both sides'. (Whitehead makes frequent use of 
'mere'; but in this instance it seems particularly infelicitous.) He 
draws attention to the different aspects of events which are dealt with in 
science and religion respectively. It should be obvious that each has its 
own areas of special, if not unique, authority ... physical phenomena for 
the one, moral and aesthetic qualities for the other. Although this is a 
summary statement, it will serve, at this stage of the argument; and it 
gives force to Whitehead's contention (1.228) that 'what one side sees, 
the other misses, and vice versa'.(4) 
He finds a bridge over the boundary (between science and religion) 
in the sense of wonder - which, said Aristotle, is the mother of wisdom 
and the appreciation of what can only be called the aesthetic. These 
axiological insights or concepts are never far below the surface for 
Whitehead. Thus, for example, he writes 
When you understand all about the sun and all about 
the atmosphere and all about the rotation of the earth 
you may still miss the radiance of the sunset .. We want 
concrete fact with a highlight thrown on what is relevant 
to its preciousness. (1.248) 
It was improper, perhaps, to use that particular quotation in close 
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succession to what was said about the conflict between religion and science; 
and yet there is, without question, a sensible connection between them. 
It is not only Peter Bell of whom it might be said 'A primrose by the 
river brim, a yellow primrose was to him, and it was nothing more'. Ful-
ness of vision requires the artist's eye; fulness of expression requires 
the poet's tongue; and the value of the aesthetic lies in its ability to 
create symbols for a level of reality which cannot be reached in any 
other way. 
J. H. Randall, in his The Role of Knowledge in Western Religion seems 
to have captured something of the spirit of Whitehead's interpretation of 
religion when he says that religious symbolism has a fourfold function, 
namely (a) to stimulate the will to moral activity, (b) to bind a community 
together by means of common symbols, (c) to communicate a quality of 
experience which is best described as aesthetic, and (d) to make us aware 
of a plane of reality in which are to be found life's depths and myst-
eries (See the preface to this work) . These four points surely have 
educational relevance. But, whatever else might be said about it, this 
interpretation of religion has no need of a really-existent divine Being. 
It is simply a life-enriching, intra-mundane experience. It seems mag-
nanimous; but it would mark in fact, the death of traditional theistic 
religion because it is essentially anthropocentric. 
It is Professor A. Boyce Gibson who reminds us (by quoting 'Beauty 
is a wider and more fundamental notion than truth' from Adventures of 
Ideas) that, for Whitehead, aesthetic values were indeed fundamental to 
his understanding of religion. He would not have been content to equate 
religion with morality, because he saw morality as something derivative, 
a compound of intellect and imagination. Negative morality, which is a 
main source of evil, has acquired its special character because it lacks 
grace. This leads to the interesting conclusion that significant religion 
is usually the result of reaction against graceless religio-moral forces 
(cf. Jesus' attacks on the Pharisees, and Paul's strictures against the 
Law). (5.147) Unfortunately the gracious aspects, both of religion and 
the morals derived therefrom, usually succumb to formalized structuring 
in later generations. 
No doubt Whitehead had this in mind when he wrote 'No part of education 
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has more to gain from attention to the rhythmic law of growth than has 
moral and religious education'.(6.62) Those who are interested in the 
technique of teaching in those fields need to remember Whitehead's 
unpalatable quip - that the vitality of the religious spirit is exhibited 
in its surviving the ordeal of religious education! He had in mind the 
kind of religious instruction which has insisted too much upon precision 
in detail at the cost of any sense of grandeur or romance. (7) 
But to return to the specific 'conflict' between religion and science. 
Whitehead shows how the Cartesian dualism had affected our scientific 
thinking because of its treating bodies and minds as independent individual 
substances. That they were considered to exist in their own rights, and 
without any necessary connection between them, was a point of view which 
harmonised with the individualism which developed after the Middle Ages. 
This emphasis on the individual and his experiences had a serious effect 
however, because 
the independence ascribed to bodily substances carried 
them away from the realms of values altogether ... They 
degenerated into a mechanism entirely valueless, except 
as suggestive of an external ingenuity .•. This state of 
mind is illustrated in the recoil of Puritanism from the 
aesthetic effects dependent upon a material medium., (1.241) 
Whitehead's main concern at that point was to illustrate a few of 
the effects such attitudes have had upon scientific thinking. But of 
more interest to us is what he had to say about the effects in other areas. 
He shows, for example, how the doctrine of minds as independent substances 
leads directly not only to private worlds of experience, but also to 
private worlds of morals. The significance of this is that 'moral intu-
itions' can then be held to apply only to the strictly private world of 
psychological experience. Whitehead suggested that, as a result,self-
respect, and the making the most of our own individual opportunities, 
together constituted the efficient morality of the leaders among the 
industrialists (of the nineteenth century) . The Western world is now 
suffering from the limited moral outlook of three previous generations. 
He held also that the assumptions of the bare valuelessness of mere matter 
led to a lack of reverence in the treatment of natural and artistic beauty. 
Whitehead maintained that when Newton produced his explanation of 
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the physical world in terms of mass and stress, he left them as detache'd 
facts, and gave no reason for their joint existence. In doing so he 
demonstrated what is a profound philosophical truth ..• a dead Nature 
can give no reasons! So, said Whitehead, during a lecture on Nature and 
Life, all ultimate reasons are in terms of aim at value. (8) 
There is, to be sure, a bonding between aesthetics, education, and 
religion which is as important as any nexus we can conceive. Yet there 
are dangers in this; for there are those who would go so far as to say 
'Religion through beauty', or even, 'Religion is·beauty' (cf. 'Beauty is 
truth, truth beauty, that is all/Ye know on earth, and all ye need to 
know' - Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn.) That there is truth in 'religion 
is beauty' may be agreed; but to reverse it and say 'then beauty is religion' 
is to make assumptions of an order which the educational process, by its 
sharpening of our critical faculties, should guard us against. 
Consistent with the aesthetic attitude is that spirit of wonder to 
which reference has already been made. Teachers in the field of religion 
are making much of this concept as contributing to an understanding of 
what is meant by 'the religious dimension'. Critics of the notion say 
that there is nothing particularly religious about it: and perhaps they 
are right, if wonder means no more than curiosity. Yet it is likely that 
the concept of wonder carries with it the thought of 'grateful acceptance' 
over and above that of the 'mental exploration' which is more appropriate 
to curiosity. Moreover it is possible that at this very point we should 
look for any essential difference there might be between science and 
religion - and also for any likely juxtaposition between them. 
Whitehead did not attempt to push aside the conflict between science 
and religion. On the contrary, he admitted that it had to be taken seriously -
with the emphasis being given to the approach to the problem rather than 
to the conflict itself. Thus he can write 
In an intellectual age there can be no active interest 
which puts aside all hope of a vision of the harmony 
of truth. To acquiesce in discrepancy is destructive 
of candour, and of moral cleanliness. It belongs to 
the self-respect of intellect to pursue every tangle 
of thought to its final unravelment. If you check 
that impulse, you will get no religion and no science 
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from an awakened thoughtfulness. The important 
question is 'In what spirit are we going to face 
the issue?' (1.242) 
That is a noble statement which, even by itself, entitles Whitehead to 
serious respect as an educator. 
Critics of religious education are forever crying 'Indoctrination' 
as they suggest that it is not possible to escape from the closed system 
and tight-knit answers provided by dogma. There would be truth in this 
_if religious education were the same as ecclesiastical instruction. 
There would also be cause for alarm if every educational contact (those 
of religion alone excepted} were entirely devoid of indoctrination. But, 
of course, this is not so. Indoctrination at various places in the educa-
tional process is inevitable, even thought it might be entirely devoid of 
evil intent! The influence of the teacher is more significant in the 
early years of schooling than in the later; in those the influence of 
the subject-matter taught becomes predominant. As J.P. White indicates 
in his Towards a Compulsory Curriculum, educators are justified in expect-
ing all pupils to know certain things both for their own good and for 
that of their society. To equip pupils for the making, in due course, 
of acts of personal acceptance or rejection (in matters other than 'num-
erical truths', let us say) is a justifiable educational aim. But in the 
initial stages of this essential learning process, and no matter how simply 
they may be expressed, certain axioms or hypotheses must be given to the 
children as the sine qua non of that learning process. Though as White 
makes clear (p.104, op.cit.) compulsion must not be confused with coercion. 
Also, the theory that we should pursue every tangle of thought to 
its final unravelment is - though splendid - not so straightforward as 
would appear. How are we to know when that conclusive state has been 
reached? Certainly there is, in some areas of life, general agreement 
that, in such a concept as (for example) 'love is better than hatred', 
a finality has been reached; and that we know this to be so, even though 
there cannot be, in the nature of things, any empirical proof for it. 
So we notice with interest how Whitehead maintains that it is 
impossible to think things through impassively. Every age, he says, 
produces people with clear logical intellects, and with the most praise-
worthy grasp of some sphere of human experience, who have elaborated, or 
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inherited, a scheme of thought which exactly fits those experiences which 
claim their interest. 'Such people are apt resolutely to ignore, or to 
explain away, all evidence which confuses their scheme with contradictory 
instances. What they cannot fit in is for them nonsense'. 
It is disturbing to read such words; the more so when we remember 
that he is not speaking of anything so crude as political propaganda, for 
example. He was issuing a warning, based on what we must assume to have 
been his own experience in the world of education and learning, that in 
any consideration of facts, standards, or values, nothing less than 
scrupulous honesty and balanced judgement could be accepted. That this 
is not always the case is not necessarily indicative of bad faith; for, 
as he confesses, it is an ideal which is not always easy to follow because 
'we cannot think first and act afterwards'. This idea was expressed at 
some length in the first Essay in The Aims of Education - that we cannot 
wait for a 'correct time' before we begin to think; nor can we refrain 
from action until after we have thought. The two processes are going on 
all the time, and always in relation to each other. 
This does not mean, of course, that all our actions are rational. 
What Whitehead wants us to see is that-'it is absolutely necessary to 
trust to ideas which are generally adequate even though we know that there 
are subtleties and distinctions beyond our ken'. (1.232) This is in no sense 
a weak appeal for us to clutch at any intellectual straw, nor is it a 
suggestion that because we cannot be omniscient we must be as if para-
lyzed. He is reminding us that, because of human frailty, we cannot 
hope to do more than adopt those ideas which experience shows to be ade-
quate in certain situations. We all inherit, by way of the traditions of 
our culture, quanta of evidence which have been shaped into general ideas. 
Though these are, as a rule, mind-extending, sometimes (as we saw above) 
they are mind-restricting. 
Again, this is neither a counsel of despair, nor a plea that we 
should be mentally docile, or 'quietist'. Whitehead could never be 
accused of anti-intellectualism! He says, for example, that those general 
ideas are never static. 'They are transformed by the urge of critical 
reason, by the vivid evidence of emotional experience, and by the cold 
-82-
certainties of scientific perception'. (1.233) 
This is well said; and the important thing about it is its round 
comprehensiveness. This is a feature of Whitehead's teachings. Great 
matters are always treated in breadth as well as in depth; though he 
sometimes gives'the impression of confusing the ideal with the actual. 
He draws a distinction between the somewhat free-ranging intellectual 
pursuits of Hellenism, and the more rigorous (both as to subject-matter, 
and methodology) enterprises of Hellenistic Alexandria; and the point he 
is making there is that although in some areas of life it is only proper 
to speak of the right and the true, there are other areas in which such 
precision is hardly possible. This view would, I believe, meet with 
popular acceptance; but educational theorists sometimes lead us to believe 
that they have overlooked it. 
Whitehead tells us that the difference between the two, namely the 
Hellenic and the Hellenistic types of mentality, may be roughly described 
as that between speculation and scholarship. For progress, both are nece-
ssary. But, in fact, on the stage of history they are apt to appear as 
antagonists. 
Though here a strange feature arises. Religion seems now so often 
to be static and rigid in its ideas and concepts. It is unfortunate, 
indeed, that the conventional 'religious outlook' tends to resist the need 
to 'think things through'. In scientific matters such an attitude would 
be absurd; in ethical matters it would be dangerous; in social or community 
matters it would be obscurantist. This gives us further reason to assume, 
therefore, that when Whitehead spoke of the religious character of educa-
tion he had in mind something other than the conventional interpretation. 
Yet, in origin, religion was speculative. In view of the fact that relig-
ion cannot work by means of logical concepts or empirical data (unless 
it is being described simply as a phenomenon within, say, sociological 
or psychological limits), speculation is, and must always be, an intrinsic 
element of religion. We are finite beings who experience 'intimations 
of reality' beyond what can be measured or investigated empirically. 
These experiences appear in aesthetic, moral, or mystical dress; and in 
our attempts to describe them we must resort to metaphor or analogy. 
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Speculation is not welcomed in the 'religious structures' however, 
because, by presenting alternative theories, it must be productive of a 
measure of scepticism. Scepticism is, as Whitehead puts it, 'always 
disturbing to established modes of prejudice'. And, as Lord Acton said 
'Few discoveries are more irritating than those which expose the pedigree 
of ideas'. 
Whitehead's optimism breaks out again when he says that speculation 
obtains its urge from a deep ultimate faith that, through and through, 
the nature of things is penetrable by reason. But true religious faith, 
be it noted, is not demonstrable in relation to its object. For if it 
were susceptible of proof it would mean that God (or the object of worship) 
could be known and established apart from faith. That would bring 'God' 
down to a level with the world of tangible, objective reality - the area 
in which alone the writ of proof can run. 
Now scholarship has to be conservative if it is to give the proper 
attention to the methods upon which it has been built up. To the scholar 
then, speculation will not be welcome either, because it will tend to 
negate the care and caution of the prescribed methodologies. Moreover, 
speculation has the habit of breaking through defined limits, and of 
crossing over from region to region of intellectual reserve. Or, as 
Whitehead put it, 'Your thoroughgoing scholar ... finds his fundamental 
concepts interpreted, twisted, modified. He has ceased to be the king of 
his own castle, by reason of speculations of uncomfortable generality, 
violating the very grammar of his thoughts!(l0.137) 
That extract draws attention to another feature of Whitehead's teach-
ing - his emphasis upon adventure, exploration, and process. He wants 
always to be moving on and out, though not always in the way that a careful 
researcher would wish to go. It is this characteristic which explains his 
emphasis on the aesthetic and other intuitive modes. We have to distinguish 
between the epistemological analysis of religious faith, and any argument 
as to the validity of that faith. 'Religious experience' is a way of 
interpreting life. That is unarguable. Whether it is illusory or verid-
ical is another matter; and with that Whitehead was not primarily concerned. 
In his Adventures of Ideas the burden is that nothing is fixed. Things 
change; no less do the laws relating to those things change. There is 
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an evolutionary process at work everywhere; and this makes the concept 
of fixed, eternal laws invalid. This applies to religion no less than 
to science. Our knowledge of anything, any phenomenon, moreover, can 
be at best, limited. That being so, our knowledge of the laws by which 
they are governed is limited also. 
Now just as some religiously-inclined people (used to) leap grate-
fully towards Heisenburg's Uncertainty Principle (11) to reinforce their 
arguments in favour of indeterminism - which they confused with free-
will - so some of a similar cast of mind will read Whitehead super-
ficially, and find in him an opponent of science and a defender of 
religion. They should take note of this passage; 
As a rebound from dogmatic intolerance, the simplicity 
of religious truth has been a favourite axiom of 
liberalising theologians. It is difficult to under-
stand upon what evidence this notion is based. In the 
physical world as science advances, we discern a complex-
ity of interrelations. There is a certain simplicity of 
dominant ideas, but modern physics does not disclose a 
simple world. To reduce religion to a few simple notions 
seems an arbitrary solution of the problem before us. 
It may be common sense; but is it true? In view of the 
horrors produced by bigotry, it is natural for sensitive 
thinkers to minimize religious dogmas. But such prag-
matic reasons are dangerous guides. This procedure 
ends by basing religion on those few ideas which in the 
circumstances of the time are most effective in producing 
pleasing emotions and agreeable conduct. (12.64) 
This comment is all the more harsh because it is true. Those who want 
to call Whitehead to their aid in producing a simple explanation of 
'religion' which they can apply to 'education' should realise that the 
search in which he guides them will be hard and rigorous, and it will 
almost certainly demand of them the relinquishing of some of their most 
dearly-held interpretations of religion. 
When religion had authority, that authority went hand-in-hand with 
an objective austerity. Now it is becoming increasingly anthropocentric, 
and relative in a weak kind of way. One sees, for example, placards 
bearing such exhortations as 'Come to church; religion is fun'. 
Teachers who profess religion, or who agree with Whitehead about the 
essence of education, must be on guard against this kind of thing if 
they wish their field of study to be taken seriously; for the implica-
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tions are disturbing~ The religious quest must probably remain open-
ended; and I would contend that a theory or a hypothesis does not have 
to be close-ended in order to possess elegance. It may develop from 
step to step in a proper and regulated fashion, and yet come to no 
conclusion - just because the terminus is unattainable in the human 
context. This will apply in all axiological categories; and it is they 
to which we attribute absoluteness. Anthropomorphic concessions cloud 
the vision! 
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Notes to Section Six 
1. Whitehead, A.N., Science and the Modern World, C.U.P., 1927. 
2. Martin, D., in The Religious and the Secular, R.K.P., 1969, says 
The spokesmen for optimistic rationalism begin their 
assumptions on the premise that religion is not true, 
i.e. it has historically involved beliefs which can be 
shown to be incorrect .•.. Once educate people properly, 
in the neutral scientific atmosphere congenial to 
rational values, and religion will steadily lose its 
grip and mankind no longer be troubled by bad dreams ..• 
The troubles of religious institutions are an inevit-
able prelude to the triumphs of truth .•. As has often 
been pointed out, this analysis lays far too much stress 
on religion as a system of explanation and on man as a 
cognitive animal. Believers are not failed rationalists, 
but human beings. 
3. Some of this intellectual activity seems to be intrinsic to the 
religious process; but a good deal more is extrinsic. In our 
particular cultural tradition we rely heavily on both the Hebrew 
and the Greek contributions. In religion intellectual entities 
(such as Aristotle's Prime Mover) are apt to become embodied in 
devotional aspirations; and hymnody is often more effectual than is 
theology as a medium of popular didactics. Speaking of the nature 
of the intellectual aspect of religion Whitehead says that it was 
the completion of a 'dispassionate metaphysic'; after Aristotle's 
time metaphysics was influenced, as I have indicated above, by 
ethical and religious interests. Aristotle's idea of God was 
philosophical rather than religious (and far less mystical than 
Plato's); and Whitehead was right to point out that metaphysics 
on its own is unlikely to go much beyond the position of Aristotle. 
Other factors have to be introduced if progress towards religion is 
to be made. 
4. Whitehead refers to the lives of John Wesley and Francis of Assissi, 
and uses them to provide an example of the difference which must 
occur depending on whether we regard them as simple manifestations 
of physical chemistry, or as events which had the most profound sig-
nificance in the history of the world. Such an illustration is 
telling, and is likely to carry conviction to anyone whose mind is 
not locked in one particular system. How can common principles be 
applied to such divergent standpoints? 
-87-
5. Norwood, C., in Education for Complete Living, ed. Cunningham and 
Radford, A.C.E.R., 1938, says 
Now the contention is merely that without a religious 
basis to its education, democracy cannot last for long. 
It must seek through its schools a totally different 
kingdom of values, and teach that, first and before all, 
must be sought truth, beauty, and goodness; qualities which 
are the reverse of those sought in the economic sphere, in 
that they are increased by being shared. The more you have 
of them, the more there is for everybody else: they can 
enlighten the schools, they can enlighten the whole life 
of the citizen community. Indeed, on any right view, rel-
igion and education are two sides of one living process of 
development, in which education fits for life, and religion 
inspires. 
6. Whitehead, A.N., Aims of Education, Benn, 1962. 
7. I am inclined to think that the contemporary emphasis (especially 
in the new curricula on Religion) on that very spirit of wonder 
already mentioned is a genuine attempt to overcome this shortcoming 
in educational responsibility, and that it might produce more educa-
tional stimulus than the more traditional emphasis on religious 
morality produced. 
8. One can see then why Whitehead was so insistent on there being an 
aesthetic component in education, and the reason for his describing 
a religious education as one which inculcates 'duty and reverence'. 
Reverence is a value which seems now to occupy a lower place than 
once it did in the scale of values. Not only reverence towards 
persons, but also reverence towards the things of nature. The 
Judea-Christian religion is considered by some to be in part resp-
onsible for this decline because of its doctrine that the world 
was created for our benefit and delight, and because Adam, the 
representative man, was charged 'to work it and subdue it'. This, 
it is said, has produced a human arrogance which has led to the 
wanton misµse of the gifts of nature. It would be fascinating to 
be able to hear Whitehead on the subject of conservation - as having 
educational, or even religious, significance~ 
9. Whitehead, A.N., Adventures of Ideas, Macmillan, 1969. 
10. 'Heisenburg had an idea that nuclear theory should be stripped of 
all non-calculable analogies drawn from human experience •. Einstein 
was the only one to dismiss a theory which allowed only for statist-
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ical but not causal interpretation of atomic processes with his 
reference to 'the dear God who does not believe in chance'. (From 
-an article in The German Tribune, February 15th, 1976. 
11. Whitehead, A.N., Religion in the Making, O.U.P., 1927. 
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Section Seven 
Religion and Rationality 
'Scientific truth is characterized by its exactness and the cert-
ainty of its predictions. But these admirable qualities are contrived 
by science at the cost of remaining on a plane of secondary problems, 
leaving intact the ultimate and decisive questions' - J. Ortega y Gasset. 
The situation described at the end of the previous section is 
undoubtedly one of the reasons why religion has been adversely criticised. 
Sometimes excessively and unreasonably so; but, as Whitehead insists 
'dispassionate criticism of religious belief is beyond all things necessary. 
The foundation of dogma must be laid in a rational metaphysics which 
criticizes meanings, and endeavours to express the most general concepts 
adequate for the all-inclusive universe'. (1.71) As we have seen already, 
Whitehead does not suggest that a rational explanation can be found for 
every event and every experience. What he does expect is that resort 
shall not be had to the irrational or the inconsistent when it comes 
to the description of religious phenomena. It is only a metaphysic which 
can provide a safeguard against the disturbing effects of religious 
emotions; and, according to his own definition, given as a footnote (1.72), 
Whitehead meant by metaphysic the science which seeks to discover the 
general ideas which are indispensably relevant to the analysis of every-
thing that happens. This implies an observation, a scrutiny, which is 
far wider than any specific investigation of a limited area; this latter 
being properly typical of the scientific method. 
In trying to understand Whitehead's attitude here we may be reasonably 
sure of finding, if not philosophic rigour at all times, then at any rate 
confident reference to values and standards as.absolutes. Paradoxically, 
however, the absolute which seems to mean the most to him is relative-
ness, or process. His book, Process and Reality, flung down the gauntlet 
to Bradley's Appearance and Reality, in which it was claimed that what 
is ultimately real cannot be in process of becoming. 
He reminds us, for example, that there are no such things as universal 
moral laws, or universally identical moral intuitions. This presents 
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something of a philosophical dilemma; and he himself held a rather neg-
ative attitude towards most moral codes because of their conservative 
nature. He denied the existence of absolutely valid universal moral 
laws which could be described as being 'quad ubique, quod semper, quod 
ab omnibus'. All societies and communities have ideals; and it is in 
the actualization of those ideals that real morality is to be found. 
Yet even they must be considered relative, for they arise at a given 
place at a given time. He sees morality as a creative, adventurous 
function rather than a passive acceptance of existing standards, and 
criticises that frame of mind which regards morality as being simply an 
innate ability or capacity in which ordinary knowledge and skills have 
no place.(2) 
Dorothy Emmet makes this comment; and it has a bearing on the 
foregoing; 
That philosophy has been able to become a religious 
faith for some of its greatest masters is a fact which 
can sustain and encourage its students. But their 
faith grew out of the whole spirit in which their 
philosophy was carried on. 
She means that a philosopher's thinking may be, for him, of such 
depth and intensity, that it takes on a religious colouring; serves, 
indeed, as a religion - for him. But, for those who have not been 
through similar mental travail, the conclusions reached by the philosopher 
are not available, except at second-hand. This is not good enough to 
serve as a religion for them. A philosopher, says Emmet 'can only allow 
himself to be turned into a prophet at his peril'. (3.150) 
The philosopher is in very different case from the theologian, 
especially in the field of ethics; for whereas the latter works within 
(or sometimes against) a worshipping community,. in which conservative 
consistency is of prime importance, the former can make his assertions of 
faith quite independently of any such environment. He can vary his 
opinions or teachings with some frequency, provided he can produce adequate 
reasons for doing so. Changes of this sort often have serious moral 
implications, depending on whether the actions of the philosopher, or the 
theologian, are consistent with his teachings. 
Whitehead might have been uncomfortable with the conventional 
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liturgical assertions and exercises of a typical Christian group (as 
Kant was; and as C.S. Lewis was - and said so quite forcefully); and 
yet, one feels, would not have rejected the idea of worship out of hand, 
provided a Platonic model was somewhere in the background~ (4.238) 
He once remarked 'if men cannot live on bread 'alone, still less can 
they do so on disinfectants' (4.87); meaning thereby that criticism was 
a legitimate operation, but that the traditional values which were the 
subject of criticism had a right to live. Disinfectants destroy bacteria; 
and, often enough, the tissue which carries them. Criticism is meant 
to destroy the irrational and inhuman aspects of tradition, but not the 
tradition as well. But. as Hegel pointed out, when the traditions of a 
culture come under scrutiny, that culture (or at least that particular 
epoch of that culture) begins to die. (cf. a reference to Thought versus 
Culture in The Philosophy of Hegel by Rauch, Monarch Press, p.69). 
Criticism does not provide for that affirmation of values which is 
distinctively the content of faith, and which usually requires some form of 
liturgical manifestation or religious expression. Whitehead realised that 
one of the great problems for Twentieth-Century Man was that of value-
creation and value-maintenance. Yet he, like many other recent writers on 
religion, warned against any facile equating of values, goodness, and 
religion. He said that it was a dangerous delusion to believe in a 
necessary connection between religion and goodness. The facts of history 
should serve to disabuse us; for although here and there religion has 
undoubtedly been a mighty agent for progress, in a wider view of time and 
place the opposite effect must be considered the more likely. (1.9 and 
1.26. But elsewhere, in modo suo, he speaks much more favourably of 
the role of religion) • 
This reference to the moral characteristics of religion is only 
incidental to our purpose at this stage, and it developed out of an 
example of Whitehead's 'relativism'. Let us return to the epistemology 
of religion, and its place or significance in the decline of religious 
authority. 
He criticises modern scholarship and modern science when they 
show defects similar to those of the Hellenistic and the scholastic 
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eras. (5) He accused professionalized scholarship (a general term, 
surely~) of limiting the free exercise of reason when it permitted only 
tautologies and the sensa as its valid data; then freeing itself 'from 
criticism by dogmatically handing over the remainder of experience to 
an animal faith or a religious mysticism, incapable of rationalization. 
The world will sink again into the boredom of a drab detail of rational 
thought, unless we retain in the sky some reflection of light from the 
sun of Hellenism'. (6.151) 
Certainly he is not attacking the rational process as such in that 
remarkable last sentence. Rather he is criticising the standpoint of 
those who think that the rational process is all, and that all can be 
reduced to rationalism. Some of the Greek philosophers might have 
believed this; others denied it. The School men tried, perhaps, to 
establish it, but there was a smart reaction. And this process of 
reaction shows signs of recurring. Increasing numbers of thinking people 
are prepared to say that reason is not the sole criterion of truth, no 
matter how legitimate its place in science and everyday affairs, and not-
withstanding its proper function in the apprehending and ordering of the 
information derived from sense-experience. As evidence for this assert-
ion I offer, for example, the six recent lengthy radio programmes in 
the A.B.C. series Investigations in which this point of view was mentioned 
by one speaker after another as they discussed the spiritual, scientific, 
intellectual, and psychological implications of what is commonly called 
'the counter-culture'. 
It would seem to be fair comment that, in one epoch rationalism is 
in the ascendent, and in another it is in decline. This alternation 
may be due to some inexplicable 'spirit of the time', but a more likely 
explanation is that new plateaux in human thinking are reached from time 
to time, from which we look back and say 'That is past'. Then, to our 
surprise, we find that the next plateau is very similar to the one on 
which we had turned our backs. 
Whitehead had something of this sort in mind when he outlined the 
difference between present and past in terms of the amount of information 
we now have. Nevertheless, our knowledge is still limited; and we must 
not, strictly speaking, move a fraction beyond those limits. Therefore 
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speculation must be ruled out (a proposition to which he could never agree). 
He sees this as the great danger in positivism and says that although 'it 
reigns supreme in the domain of science' it is, in truth, the one doctrine 
which can the least effectively face facts! 'It has never been acted on' 
he says, 'it can never be acted on, for it gives no foothold for any 
forecast of the future around which purpose can weave itself', (6.159. 
My emphasis) • 
At the time of his writing this, Whitehead was attacking positivism 
in a way which is no longer necessary; and allowance has to be made for 
this personal involvement. But he made a good point when he said that 
if we relied solely on observed fact it would be irrational and improper 
for any guess to be made as to the future. 
In respect of logical positivism Jacques Barzun maintains that 'every 
student of Western civilization must be indebted to Whitehead's great work', 
not least for the reason discussed in the previous paragraph. (He was 
referring to Science and the Modern World particularly) • He regretted 
that a whole school of philosophy should take as its central doctrine 
that language would provide the answer to even our deepest problems. The 
relevant extract is given in the Notes (7.4) along with one by 
G.K. Chesterton, which E. Mascall thought good enough to refer to in his 
noteable Words and Images. Both Barzun and Mascall were reminding us that 
words are symbols which, in themselves, are fragile and approximate. 
That Whitehead also realised this we may assume from his dictum that 
'not a sentence or a word is independent of the circumstances under 
which it is uttered. True scholarly thought never forgets this truth'. 
Our understanding of word-meaning is not restricted by rules; and as a 
result of this, words have acquired extra meanings, so to speak, and over-
tones. It is this element of imprecision which, according to Whitehead, 
allows us to communicate with one another at levels below that of conven-
tional, literal expression. (8) 
Whitehead's critique of rationalism is due, perhaps to the fact that 
there have been times (and not in the eighteenth century only) when the 
sublime authority of reason has been asserted in ways which can only be 
described as extravagant. As an illustration of this I refer to Paul 
Hazard's comment in his European Thought in the Eighteenth Century. He 
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maintains that, to reason has been ascribed qualities of infallibility 
and omnipotence. Not authority - for reason has no need of that; reason 
is its own authority and will preserve those who make use of it from 
error and aberration. (9.40) 
Hazard is reminding us that if an idea is quite clear, then it is 
finished - in the same way that a definition (note the etymology), or a 
rabbit on a dissecting slab, is finished. In the history of ideas 
imagination is as important as reason. Indeed, it could be maintained 
that, both in logical and historical priority, imagination preceded 
reason. (9.46) 
Hazard's eloquent passage is in the manner of Whitehead. It could 
be regarded as mere rhetoric; but not if it is seen as part of a greater 
whole. Obviously there must be some elements of experience (by far the 
greatest number indeed) of which it may be said, 'These things we know. 
We do not have to experiment and to discover, everyone for himself'. 
In addition there are also those elements about which we intuit, imagine, 
and dream. They could be called the on-going elements of experience; and 
religion would certainly be included among them. It is they which enable 
us to project into the future. It is they which provide the foundations 
for the concept of purpose. 
Doubtless, Whitehead was of this opinion when he was led to suggest 
that we have in human solitariness the seed-bed of religion. 'The great 
religious conceptions which haunt the imagination of civilized mankind 
are scenes of solitariness; Prometheus chained to his rock, Mahomet 
brooding in the desert, the meditations of the Buddha, the solitary man 
on the Cross'. (1.19) Although his rhetoric gets the better of his 
theology here, the emphasis lies, in fact, on the rationality of the 
religion experienced in these awe-inspiring moments of solitariness in 
which a sense of detachment from the mundane leads to a deep conception 
of the universal. (In the case of Jesus also the temptations in the 
wilderness would have been more apposite). 
Whitehead claims that the human spirit does not come to an under-
standing of life-affecting values until individuality is merged into 
objectivity of such a kind that we may say 'Religion is world-loyalty'. 
(cf. Religion in the Making, p.60). 
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Naturally enough, when considering the intrinsic values which are 
realized through the desires of finite things, Whitehead turns to the 
aesthetic order, not to the logical. The astonishing thing is that he 
holds the aesthetic order to be the highest type of order because it is 
the most concrete~ Indeed, in his Modes of Thought (page 83) he goes 
so far as to say that both the logical and the moral orders are but 
aspects of the aesthetic, and that the foundation of the world is in 
aesthetic experience. If the universe has a purpose, that is, it is 
the production of Beauty (in the widest sense of that word). 
Religious solitariness leads to a kind of 'personal empiricism', 
the results of which are not to be gainsaid. It plays, moreover, an 
essential part in religious epistemology. It is on the strength of 
available evidence in all the major religions that we find justification 
for saying that 'religious silence' must not be described as atheism or 
agnosticism - or ignorance. The religious visionary need not be seen as 
one who is speechless as a result of being baffled or frustrated, so much 
as 'struck dumb with wonder', as it were. This has positive value rather 
than negative. It is the silence of caution in face of the dangers inherent 
in any direct attempt to describe the supreme reality of religious exper-
ience. 
Whitehead was not alone in being dismayed by the confident manner in 
which religious realities and attitudes have sometimes been deffned; 
especially in those religions which are based on revelation and divine 
disclosure. We come again to the question of epistemology; for, if 
God is indeed transcendent, how can there be any communication between 
Him and those who lay claim to the revelation? It is significant that 
Whitehead refers sympathetically to the Asian religions. This is because 
they have avoided thattensionwhich seems to have become an inbuilt 
element in our culture between 'western science' and 'western religion' 
(with all that.implies in the realms of education and epistemology). 
In the particular culture-patterns we have inherited, it is as if the 
signal 'religion' had been coded to produce the sole response 'Christianity'. 
Thus the concept is limited; and Whitehead himself was aware of this diff-
iculty. Christianity is so essentially a structured religion, based 
upon the foundation doctrine that man fell into sin, that too close an 
identification between religion and Christianity is bound to produce grave 
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difficulties both in educational practice and epistemological theory. 
These difficulties are compounded rather than resolved by some of the 
modern attempts to explain the mystery of religion in terms of paradox. 
In the outcome, this usually leads to a humanism, the main pre-occupation 
of which is to be relevant! 
H.D. Lewis reminds us that oriental religion, in its avoidance of 
the sharp distinction between the here and the hereafter, opens the way 
to a recognition of the proper place of the inner life (in which the 
religious experience is to be placed); and he says that, in contrast, in 
many influential quarters of western philosophy,'their repudiation of 
any finite access to our own thoughts and experiences is almost axio-
matic'. (10.189} 
Beyond certain limits it is impossible to consider integra~i~g the 
Christian religion with other faiths because, as has been known from 
the earliest days of the Christian era, the concepts of incarnation and 
revelation are unavoidable stumbling-blocks. There is no way round this 
difficulty, except by way of attenuation, or travesty, of Christianity. 
Did Whitehead make allowance for such matters when he said that the 
essence of education is that it be religious? 
We must now enquire, therefore, how religion gives shape to communal 
and personal living (which, in itself, must be one of the functions of 
education as well). Its systematic or theological expressions may be, 
indeed, no more than protective shelters against the rigours of our 
psychic or spiritual environment. Within protective shelters, however, 
there is opportunity for the growth of what we call the arts and graces 
of civilization. Theological tradition has played a major part in assist-
ing the development of manners and morals; and we cannot overlook the role 
played by religious themes in the arts of mankind. All the arts, without 
exception. Religion, in providing the dynamic, provides also some meta-
physical stability, even though it be a fragile thing. 
It is typical of much current popular theological thought that it 
is concerned overmuch with the immanent. It tends to find its categories 
of explanation in psychology, sociology - and, even, parapsychology. 
The effect of this is to minimise the transcendent, and so to deprive us 
of an external point of reference. It places overmuch emphasis on one 
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interpretation of truth, and denigrates the role of imagination. Whitehead 
saw this danger clearly; and that is, without question, one reason why he 
emphasised the role of the aesthetic, in religion as in anything else. 
It is not possible, in the nature of things, for us to experience 
the Transcendent. Yet any worthwhile interpretation of religion must 
include an experience which is acknowledged to be transcendent. It is 
out of these individual experiences that religion, as a phenomenon, has 
developed: but it is in this latter sense that religion has become a trad-
ition, a social phenomenon; and, in consequence, second-hand. It is likely 
that Whitehead did not give sufficient weight to this fact; for his use 
of 'religion' sometimes give the impression that he is referring to a social 
concept, or an intellectual tradition rather than a living individual 
experience. As against this, however, are those statements of his about 
religion and solitariness, and the comparative worthlessness of the 
second-hand. He was but one of the many who have found utter consistency 
in this respect impossible of achievement! 
It is more than likely that Whitehead, being a master of Greek, and 
classical culture, would have in mind, whenever he spoke of 'god', the 
word theos. Theos, in the Greek, has a meaning wider than that of 'god'. 
It stands for the transcendental reference which humanity, in any age, is 
accustomed to give to life. We would describe it nowadays rather in terms 
of 'the numinous', or 'the sense of wonder, or mystery'. In this sense 
we could say of religion that it is both the awareness of the mystery and 
the impulse to understand it. This might seem to be equivocal; but it is, 
I believe, inescapable. 
Contemporary religion lacks what traditional religion had; that is, 
the power to co-ordinate thought and feeling in the wide contextual idea 
that the universe is purposeful, and beneficent. Such a style of think-
ing could be expressed only in analogy, of course; and this is so even if 
we feel obliged to take revelation into account. (It could have come 
about, incidentally, only in those periods of human history in which it 
was generally agreed that an over-ruling supra-human providence was in 
supreme and constant command; it cannot persist once we start thinking 
that human destiny lies entirely in human hands). 
Whitehead would have had little sympathy with a Barthian theology; 
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not even when Barth himself had begun to relent somewhat in his attitude 
towards natural theology. Yet Barth had a point when he protested against 
idealistic metaphysics in which God was reduced to a definition, or to an 
explanation of the rational system of the universe. Whitehead also pro-
tested, as we have seen, against 'paying metaphysical compliments to God'; 
but he went on to say that God was in himself the supreme exemplification 
of our metaphysical principles rather than one who should be invoked to 
save them from collapse. This idea gives a good indication of what 
Whitehead thought religion to be, and how different anything he said 
about it was likely to be from those conventional interpretations which 
are summed up, for instance, in the well-known line 'O God our help in 
ages past ..• '! It is necessary then always to keep in mind the varieties 
of understanding and interpretation which exist in respect of theology. 
Thus a Thomistic theology (in which philosophy is regarded as a preparatory 
exercise to theology) is very different from a Barthian. Whitehead could 
never have accepted any system which required the sacrificium intellectus: 
and yet he is prepared to go beyond the limits of the intellect, as some 
of his quoted sayings have shown. 
Nevertheless, a fundamental question to be asked of all theological 
statements is 'Do these reflect God as He Who Is? or God as the Author 
of Nature?'. (Pascal felt the dilemma, as we know from his heart-cry 
against the God of the philosophers). The latter question would be more 
in the nature of a myth than were the older theologies because (since 
the radical shift of thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) 
of a growing disaffection with the language of analogy, and a growing 
rejection of the cosmological 'proofs'. I have mentioned elsewhere how 
religion as a study is replacing theology, because God is increasingly 
being considered to be an object of investigation instead of as ultimate 
reality, the fons et origo, no less, of 'god-talk'. (One can see the 
virtue in the attitudes adopted by Bultmann, Tillich, and Bonhoefer 
without necessarily going all the way with them.) 
Since that time, and as a result of the influence of scientific ways 
of thought, there has been a growing insistence on making words 'mean 
what they say'. It has transpired that the language of religious exper-
ience has been given a literalness which has militated against it. (It 
-99-
is as true now as when it was first written that 'philosophy can clip an 
angel's wings'!) This might help us to understand why Whitehead expressed 
himself in religious terminology to which he gave unorthodox explana-
tions (it being a custom of his to use familiar words in new senses), 
whilst C.S. Lewis, for example, found satisfaction in orthodox terminology 
which he expanded imaginatively (even to writing an appendix on Tao in 
his pamphlet The Abolition of Man!) Each would have explained the title 
of this dissertation in very different fashion; yet each could have meant 
what he said. Thus the same words would have received different inter-
pretations. Whitehead, from his point of view, and Lewis from his •..• 
each was an artist or a poet who would have felt inhibited if he had been 
required to give to words only the plain meanings associated with them by 
scientists and positivists. Each had his times of precision, needless to 
say. Lewis, when he was writing strictly as theologian; and Whitehead 
when he was writing with the symbols of mathematics and logic. 
Even in logical argument a point must eventually be reached when we;,~ 
• #. 
ask 'How do we know that?' - the point at which and for which there is 
no proof; no answer, indeed. Here literalness breaks down •. It is not 
by any procedure that we know the point to be sound. We just know; we 
cannot validate it any other way. If this seems to be dogmatic, to sugg-
est that we have a faculty (cf. the supposed irreducible appreciation of 
'the numinous', in which our humanity consists) by which we acquire such, 
or hold such knowledge might seem somewhat less dogmatic, perhaps. 
Though no proof can be given of this either; and it is but a concession 
to the prevailing scientific temper. 
The fact remains, however, that the things we know without applying 
procedures (as Whitehead put it) are foundational to our knowledge. This 
is true of what for want of a better term we might call the psychic realm, 
just as much as it is true for the axioms of mathematics and the sciences. 
This is conceptual knowledge; and it is quite different from perceptual. 
Intuition is a kind of metaphoric perception: conceptual knowledge is 
intuition. All our understanding has a background of knowledge which is 
not reasoned or argued. We do not acquire meaningful knowledge only when 
we are consciously, or with effort, cogitating. Many unconscious or 
effortless experiences may have the power of creating vital changes in 
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one's way of life. We make new connections among items which are already 
present in our minds, to make new knowledge. We do not always need new 
data for the learning of something new, that is to say. 
A right understanding of this situation would give a fresh outlook 
on the matter of drawing limits to methods of acquiring knowledge. To 
make barriers between emotion, feeling, and rationality is to reduce 
the dignity of the powers of the human mind. This is a problem which 
lies at the heart of what might be called 'religious epistemology'. (11) 
It should be remembered that religious statements are not proposit-)' 
ions (except in so far as they might be steps in a logical process based 
upon some datum of belief) • They cannot, therefore, be held to be true 
or false in any propositional sense. It should be remembered also that 
this is not the only sense in which truth is to be conceived, even though 
the propositional notion of truth and falsehood has tended to dominate 
our Western style of thinking since the time of the Enlightenment. The 
revelational style of religion, at any rate, has always asserted that 
faith is not a belief in theories; and that salvation is not to be had 
through a doctrinal system. If firm hold had at all times been kept on 
that notion, there would have been a deeper understanding of the nature 
of truth itself. Impersonal truth does indeed lend itself to statement 
form; but personal truth appears in another quality. More will be said 
about this in the final section, in which the teacher-pupil relation-
ship is discussed. 
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Notes to Section Seven 
1. Whitehead, A.N., Religion in the Making, C.U.P., 1927. 
2. This is a theory which has invaded some educational systems in 
recent years, and which is now producing the inevitable reaction 
(as expressed, for example, in the Black Papers, 1975, see 
Appendix, p.115). Dewey was perturbed by this 'naturalist' atti-
tude, seeing that it could lead to an educational dichotomy, 
namely the acquisition of knowledge of the one hand, and the 
growth, by natural process, of morals on the other. This could 
lead, in turn, to the downgrading of moral education so that it 
became a form of catechetical instruction instead of being the 
result of rational process. This typifies a popular view that 
morality is something which is acquired rather than achieved. 
It does not need to be learned~ 
3. Emmet, D.M., The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, Macmillan, 1945. 
And, it might be added, at the peril of those who accept him 
as a prophet. In this context a prophet would be one who made 
proclamations which were necessarily moral in character. My 
suggestion here is that the ethical management of a society and 
its citizens is not simply a matter of natural or instinctual 
endowment. Furthermore, although each one must employ his powers 
of reason in making moral decisions, this does not exempt him 
from referring to traditional standards, or make him independent 
of roots in the past. 
4. Whitehead, A.N., Science and the Modern World, C.U.P., 1926. 
5. Into those I do not intend to go; for this criticism is much too 
general for our present study. Suffice it to say that these defects 
take the form of dogmatic assertions based upon inadequate physical 
or metaphysical data. The modern alternatives show a similar dog-
matism, after excluding teleology as a source of explanation. 
6. Whitehead, A.N., Adventures of Ideas, Macmillan, 1969. 
7. Barzun, J., Science the Glorious Entertainment, Secker and Warburg, 
1964. 
That this should be the age in which a school of philosophy 
has taken language as the sole source of light upon man's 
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oldest problems, upon his duty and his destiny, is under-
standable but not re-assuring. When literary critics study 
a text in the belief that it is made up of units of meaning 
akin to hard-edged units of science and mathematics, which 
they can therefore count and classify like geologists work-
ing in rocks and fossils, they waste their time and blunt 
their sensibilities. The philosophers of language make the 
same mistake when they try to analyse the reality of fact 
or feeling by scanning the words of propositions in a vacuum. 
cf. G.K. Chesterton's spectacular passage: 
Whenever a man says to another 'prove your case' defend your 
faith', he is assuming the infallibility of language: that 
is to say, he is assuming that a man has a word for every 
reality in earth, or heaven, or hell. He knows that there 
are in the world tints more bewildering, more numberless, 
and more nameless than the colours of an autumn forest .••. 
yet he seriously believes that these things can everyone of 
them, in all their tones and semitones, be accurately rep-
resented by an arbitrary system of grunts and squeals. He 
believes that an ordinary civilized stockbroker can really 
produce out of his own inside, noises which can denote all 
mysteries of memory and all the agonies of desire ••• for 
the truth is, that language is not a scientific thing at 
all, but wholly an artistic thing, a thing invented by 
hunters, and killers, and such artists, long before science 
was dreamed of. 
8. Whitehead, although hardly to be called an existentialist, described 
metaphysics in this way. 
Philosophy is akin to poetry, and both of them seek to 
express that ultimate good sense which we term civiliza-
tion. In each case there is reference to form beyond the 
direct meanings of words. Poetry allies itself to metre, 
philosophy to mathematic pattern. (From the final para-
graph of Modes of Thought, Macmillan, 1938, p.237 f.) 
9. Hazard, P., European Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Pelican, 1954. 
10. Lewis, H.D., Philosophy of Religion, E.U.P., London, 1965. 
11. Much is heard nowadays of the 'gut reacti9n' as a means of testing 
validity. Bronowski, in the last of his Voyage Round a Twentieth 
Century Skull talks attacked the idea because of its liability to 
mislead us, who are essentially cerebral creatures. It is interest-
ing to find John Passmore (A Hundred Years of Philosophy, Pelican, 
1972, p.341) writing 
Philosophers have been misled, Whitehead suggests, because 
they have supposed that sight is the typical mode of relation-
-103-
ship; Whitehead exhorts them to reflect upon their 
visceral sensations .••• from which they will be the 
more likely to comprehend the relationships which 
together make up the universe. 
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Section Eight 
Religion, Education, and the Teacher 
"Religion to be understood and appreciated properly, needs to be 
set in a full educational context; and the educational process, in 
order to be complete, needs to take account of the phenomenon of rel-
igion with all its claims about human nature and destiny" - Ninian Smart 
To Whitehead, the process thinker, every thing was an occasion of 
experience which stood in contextual relationship with the whole world! 
Every entity is related, no matter how remotely, to every other entity. 
So then experience is a datum. But we need to learn the meaning of 
experience. If we are able to verbalize it, so much the better for our 
comprehension and inter-personal communication. There are some exper-
iences however which strike too deeply for us to verbalize them; and 
many a grieving parent (let us say), with a newly-dead child,has con-
firmed this. Moreover, even when using words, we have to rely on what 
we already know in our efforts to communicate with one another. A phys-
icist, for example, when talking to another physicist, creates a different 
situation of verbal communication and understanding from the one he would 
create if he were talking to a shop assistant about the same topic. Every 
conversation is between human beings who already have a vast fund of 
knowledge amongst themselves which need not expressly be invoked. There 
are meanings within meanings, and meanings beyond meanings(l). There is 
'in group' talk; there are myths; there are symbols such as flags or 
temples, which may do more than speech does for the communicating of 
meaning; and there is music, which might be more evocative than them all. 
Both in religion, and in other areas of human experience, we are 
able to communicate by these symbols and evocative expressions. Yet 
it is fair to say that, of some experiences, simply because they are 
intrinsically incommunicable, expression cannot possibly be clear; and, 
of others, because they are incommunicable, the only expression will 
be silence! From Plato to Spinoza, from Aquinas to Wittgenstein, this 
has been acknowledged. 
"I do not know" can mean, therefore, "I am just not able to give 
you an account of the matter", as well as "I have no comprehension 
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of it at all". This would not have satisfied Socrates, of course; 
for he claimed that to be able to say what was meant by justice was 
an essential part of our understanding what justice was. But though 
that may be the argument of philosophers, it is neither entirely true, 
nor entirely satisfactory. Not everyone, not even the expert, can 
verbalize precisely all he knows or does. (By 'verbalize precisely' 
I imply, for example, that A can convey to B a complete understanding 
and interpretation of an experience which A has had). To know the 
limits of our own powers of expression does not justify our thinking 
that we have, in fact, discovered the limits of human potential. There 
is an ever-growing fund of human understanding; and it is likely that 
there are ways of understanding and knowledge to which formal expression 
has not yet been given. Philosophers who speak of limits of understanding 
speak of a difficulty as if it were an impossibility. It is simply a 
frontier! 
And the frontier of ignorance is also the frontier of knowledge. 
Yet it is fairly certain that the 'imprecision' (according to many con-
temporary thinkers) of language which is characteristic of the religious 
experience, is partly responsible for the alleged decline of religion and 
its influence. "The language seems not to tell us anything about a phen-
omenon which seems not to do anything", so to speak! This imprecision 
is responsible also for the growth of a quasi-religious terminology, the 
intention behind which is to give religion a new acceptability, if not a 
new popularity, among the secular fields of experience, the terminology 
of which has been borrowed. 
Whitehead wrote of the 'gradual decay of religious influence in 
European civilization', but gave no evidence for this statement based on 
criteria which would have been universally acceptable. Indeed, what 
criteria could he have given after his insistence on the essentially 
solitary nature of the religious experience? This could well invalidate 
any data derived from a Racial context. Nevertheless his claim that 
there had been 'a steady fall in religious tone' would meet with wide 
agreement. 
This remark is deeper than a first glance might indicate. He main-
tained, of religion in general, that a steady decline could be observed; 
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and this must be put in the context of his other statement that 'religion 
is tending to degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to embellish 
a comfortable life'.(2.233) Whitehead had seen the adverse influences 
to which religion had been subjected as a result of the teachings and 
discoveries of •• say •• Feuerbach, Comte, Marx, Darwin, and Freud. He 
was not so aware, perhaps, as we are of the ever-increasing pressures 
(characteristic of our contemporary Western society) from direct or 
frontal attack, particularly of an intellectual or pseudo-intellectual 
kind, which is brought to bear on religion. I refer here to such things 
as 'popular' sociology or'mass-media' psychology which, though ephemeral, 
leave their mark. 
He attributed the degeneration, however, to two causes. The first 
(which contradicts to some extent the previous sentence) is 'the unprec-
edented intellectual progress over the past two centuries'. Underlying 
this comment is the suggestion that religion must succumb more and more 
to a hostile intellectualism. Not an active external hostility, perhaps, 
so much as an inherent hostility. Whitehead contrasts the way in which 
scientific knowledge has always been able to expand as new facts have 
been presented to it, with the way in which religious thinkers have 
always been caught unprepared. (Here is further evidence of his following 
the general tendency to identify religion with Christianity; for it is 
not true of Hinduism or Buddhism, for example. They are not subject to 
such rigid rules of 'correctness' as those which are applied to Christianity; 
and they do not, in consequence, make sharp distinctions between permissible 
and heretical ideas.) 
Religion (and I am continuing the identity) must, as a result, 
always give the impression of being one or more phases out-of-date. What 
is worse is that religious doctrines tend to be shifted from the area of 
the essential to that of the desirable, and then from the area of the 
desirable to that of the optional. In this way the intellectual authority 
of religious styles of thought is being constantly eroded. 
Religious thinkers have trusted overmuch to dogma, and have been 
too reliant on the authority which they have believed dogma to have. 
Lord James of Rusholme, in writing about authority in education, des-
cribes the breakdown of traditional patterns of discipline in educational 
establishments; and remarks that, in that environment, the ultimate authority 
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is that of knowledge itself. (3.67 f) This has important connotations 
in the field of religion, if for no reason other than that the authority 
of religion cannot be seen to lie in that area unless its claims to an 
authentic knowledge-system be admitted. He then says 'education is one 
of the principal means by which a society seeks to perpetuate its values; 
it is through education that it produces workers of different kinds on 
which its prosperity, its happiness, and, most importantly, the tone 
and quality of its life depend'. (3.78) The perpetuation of values 
would be seen as one of the main functions of religion also. That is 
one reason why it, along with conventional types of education, is subject 
to radical criticism. 
One can sense the meaning and importance of a statement such as the 
foregoing, whilst confessing, at the same time, that it is all very well, 
and begs many questions about education as well as about society. Though 
more to our purpose perhaps, is the question 'In what areas, precisely, 
can 'religious teachers' be expected to have authority?' Not only those 
who teach religion, but those as well who teach according to Whitehead's 
dictum that the essence of education is that it be religious? The pop-
ular phrase 'Religion is caught, not taught' gives a hint; but it belongs 
in a context which is not really germane to our argument. Of what sort, 
then, can their authority be said to be?(4) 
When there is a change of ideas in science, this is usually seen to 
be an advance. A similar claim is made when there are changes in phil-
osophical theories. A change in religious theories, on the other hand, 
is often taken to signify a retreat. Hence the traditional emphasis 
on dogma as well as doctrine. In them safety is thought to dwell. 
Whitehead expects religion to face change as science faces change. 
He uses the idea that although basic principles may be taken to be eter-
nally valid, they must constantly be re-stated in contemporary terms 
and categories •. But this is easier said than done! Re-statement often 
becomes, in reality, statement about something quite different. (Hence 
the scepticism, amongst the supporters of traditional religious doctrine, 
about Whitehead's God-theory.) It is true that religion should not be 
allied with scientific statements which are now demonstrably false. Yet 
so much religious symbolism (which is, unfortunately, often taken lit-
erally), and popular expectation, are associated with the 'three-decker 
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universe' for example, or a messianism of dire apocalyptic. (5) 
Whitehead did not see the advance of scientific frontiers as con-
stituting an essential threat to religion. Granted that the assertions 
of religion must constantly be adapted (to a process theologian this, 
one imagines, poses no great difficulty) ••. but 'the progress of science 
must result in the increasing codification of religious thought, to the 
great advantage of religion' .(2.234) 
One can but envy his optimism, of course; but sees that it is simply 
a reasonable development of his theory of dialectic. In anything but 
formal logic, contradiction is a necessary step towards the attainment 
of real knowledge. This, he says, is one great reason for the utmost 
toleration of variety of opinion.(6.119) and (7) And he himself gives 
the reason for his optimism in this way. Having admitted that religion 
is the expression of one type of fundamental experience, he adds that 
'religious thought develops into an increasing accuracy of expression, 
disengaged from adventitious imagery; the interaction between religion 
and science is one great factor in promoting this development'. (2.236) 
He also gives a second and more subtle explanation for the decline 
of religion; but the acceptability of this explanation depends on whether 
we can share the meaning he gives to 'religion'. He certainly does not 
use the word to refer to church-centred activities. They are not nece-
ssarily excluded of course; but he suggests that the religious institution 
maintains its hold only so long as it reflects the hierarchical structures 
of the society of which it is a part, and so long as it can provide 
answers for human fears. He even hints that the role of the religious 
institution (and he is speaking quite generally) is to inculcate fear. 
Nevertheless, these are conditions of the old, bad ways. (2.237) Religion, 
in its modern manifestations, is more concerned with the comfortable 
organisation of_ society! 
Whitehead is quite scathing about the way in which religious ideas ••. 
by nature strong, and constructive, and critical ••. have been degraded 
until they are now nothing better than the accompaniments to 'pleasing 
social relations'. It is interesting to note, however, the reason why 
he thinks this degradation occurs. It is a direct result of 'the influence 
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of keener ethical intuitions'; or, in other words, religious ideas (such 
as are expressed in formal acts of worship, or sacrifice, let us say) 
are ennobled by ethical interpretation. The Old Testament prophets knew 
.that long ago, and they would have shared Whitehead's opinion that 
'religious conduct is not simply a sanctioning of conventional social 
rules; and, moreover, that the essential content of religion is not 
expressed by the one word 'conduct••.(2.237) 
One imagines that Whitehead would not have wished to be thought of 
as an antinomian; but he would have been in good company. Jesus and Paul 
were guilty of voicing similar thoughts which were critical both of 
society and of its religion; and Socrates 'corrupted the youth' in much 
the same way. 
It is of significance that many teachers and parents are willing 
to have religion (by which is meant here the religion of the local 
culture) taught in state schools, provided it means nothing more than 
morality, or good citizenship. It would be seen, at best, as a means 
to a useful social end. But if the concept of 'religion' is to have 
any life or substance at all, it must refer, inter alia, to something 
which transcends anthropomorphic standards of reference. If the concept 
'god' is to produce anything of a sense of awe or reverence, or if it 
is to have any influence on our understanding of duty, there must be 
an external quality about it. The traditional 'God-ou~-there' concept 
cannot be dismissed without a downgrading of the God-concept itself. 
This is a terrible dilemma which no one who is concerned about the 
relationship between religion and education can escape. Dogmatism must 
be avoided; yet some kind of form and structure must be upheld. (8.74 f) 
In some subjects this will occasion not the slightest difficulty; but that 
certainly does not apply to religious education. 
It is John Macquarrie who maintains that 'the religious spirit 
still remains active', even though it has been overtaken by decay. He 
notes how Whitehead criticises institutional Christianity whilst still 
allowing religion to have a creative role. This he explains by showing 
how Whitehead saw a three-phase historical development in the religious 
phenomenon. 
I 
i I 
l 
~ ~ j 
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First there was Plato's insight that the divine 
persuasion is foundational to the order of the 
world, an insight which anticipates a doctrine 
of grace. Next, there was the life of Christ 
which revealed in act what Plato had divined in 
theory. Thirdly, there was the attempted synthesis 
in theology of Plato's intellectual insight into 
practical Christianity. But this attempt at syn-
thesis failed. Theology lapsed into dogmatic 
finality, and clung to outmoded ideas which turn 
the notion of divine persuasion into the doctrine 
of a despotic God who stands over against the 
world as a coercive Power. 
Perhaps too much need not be made of the distinction between a 
notion and a doctrine in this context; but, says Macquarrie, Whitehead 
was telling us that if we are to have a theology which points effectually 
and truly to the Platonic ideals of divine persuasion, then a new reform-
ation is required in which the doctrine of divine compulsion (as taught 
by formalised Christianity) is rejected. (9.275) Only in that way can 
religion play its creative enlivening role. 
The significance of this for religious education is not hard to see. 
Macquarrie observes that a nee-realism such as that of Whitehead 'tries 
to avoid many of the pitfalls which attended traditional metaphysics, and 
the errors of old-fashioned naturalism .•• and the danger of anti-intellect-
ualism such as showed itself in the so-called 'life-philosophies'. 
The kind of religion which Whitehead found acceptable would seem 
to have something to commend it for the class-room situation. It steers 
between the over-confident claims of a revelationism (to coin a word) , 
and the sometimes brash claims of a religious pragmatism which shows 
itself as an over-enthusiastic morality. Religion is to be regarded as 
an end in itself, and not as an intellectual discipline, an epistemological 
method, or a coercive towards pre-determined forms of behaviour. 
Whitehead.might wish us to be careful about our use of the concept 
'supernatural'; but he was faithfully reported, one feels sure by his 
disciple Dorothy Emmet when she wrote 'religion loses its nerve when 
it ceases to believe that it expresses in some way truth about our rela-
tion to a reality beyond ourselves which ultimately concerns us'. (10) 
The full force of that statement can be felt only within a community of 
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belief. It must be pointed out that 'to believe' is the verb which is 
related appropriately to both belief and faith ••• in whatever context 
these may appear, scientific, or metaphysical, or religious. Faith is 
involved in religion; but religion is not simply a believing something. 
or believing in something. The kind of faith that is religious is 
involved faith; and that is the response to a concern which touches the 
root of our being. No doubt that is why Whitehead went on to describe 
'religious education' as being that which inculcates duty and reverence. 
Education that is religious must be 'involved education'. 
Some years ago it was common for philosophers to interpret the valid-
ity of religious discourse by models derived from perceptual discourse or 
scientific discourse. Those models did not succeed well in capturing 
the most distinctive features of religious discourse. More recently, and 
under the influence of the later Wittgenstein perhaps, other approaches 
have become common. But, encouraging though these may be, they tend to 
have the effect of isolating religion from other modes of experience in 
a way which can only be seen as unreal. It isworthnoting that there is 
a parallel between scientific 'experience' and scientific explanation, 
within the community of science, and religious 'experience' and theological 
explanation, within the believing community. But, as suggested above, 
belief is appropriate to both communities. 
Bearing in mind the statement of Professor Emmet, and the situation 
just described, I should wish to say that the authority of teachers of 
religion is to be sought in their honesty and integrity, coupled with a 
diligence towards both their subject and their pupils. The authority of 
teachers in general lies, no doubt, in the very same area .•.• if indeed 
'the essence of education is that it be religious'. Teachers are the 
guardians of that authority which is present whenever truth is revealed 
or disclosed. They should not lose their nerve when they find themselves 
in such a position that they cannot express their knowledge precisely, nor 
describe exactly the limits of what they have felt or experienced posit-
ively. Neither need they feel personally responsible for the hesitant 
answers they might make in such an event, so long as they know and make 
use of the great stores of traditional wisdom which have been preserved 
in the classical, humanist, and religious forms and ideals. (See also the 
essay by D.S. Wringe in Philosophy and the Teacher, ed. Lloyd, R.K.P., '1976.) 
) 
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This final section is meant to throw some light on the meaning 
the Whitehead statements have in the classroom situation, or wherever 
educational values are propagated. For it is here that the conceptual 
problem outlined in the Preface will confront the teacher most sharply. 
He may be clear in his own mind what 'religion' means; and it is 
most likely that he will have a personal commitment to it, or against 
it. This implies that no religion is intrinsically and essentially 
coercive. At best it invites; and the invitation can be rejected as 
readily as it can be accepted. 
But Whitehead asserts that the essence of education is that it be 
religious. Is Whitehead here describing something which is also non-
coercive; or does it assume a convincing, meaningful quality in the 
teaching situation? If the teacher believes that it does, then he 
needs to guard against the very real difficulties of (a) tending to 
give a bias to his teaching such as will favour his own attitude towards 
religion (and this would have educational implications beyond that of 
indoctrination); or (b) trying to be so neutral towards the concept that 
he evacuates the cognate concept 'religious' of any meaning. 
The extracts from Smart, and the other writers quoted in this 
Section, illustrate Whitehead's contention that 'religious' refers to 
those qualities (e.g. truth, integrity, respect, openness •..• with regard 
to persons as much as to facts) which enable us to recognise a situation 
as being educational. To that extent we may agree that we have, in a 
context which seems to be both traditional and conservative, a coercive 
power by which adventures into new territories of learning can be made. 
1. 
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Notes to Section Eight 
The intellectual seeks in various ways, the casuistry of 
which extends into infinity, to endow his life with a 
pervasive meaning, and thus to find unity with himself, 
with his fellow men, and with the cosmos. It is the 
intellectual who transforms the concept of the world 
into the problem of meaning. As intellectualism 
suppresses belief in magic, the world's processes 
become disenchanted, lose their magical significance, 
and henceforth simply are and happen but no longer 
signify anything. As a consequence, there is a growing 
demand that the world and the total pattern of life be 
subject to an order that is significant and meaningful. 
Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Methuen, p.125 
2. Whitehead, A.N., Science and the Modern World, C.U.P., 1953 
3. Rusholme, Lord James of, Authority in a Changing World, Constable, 
1969. 
4. I use the phrase 'religious teachers' deliberately (though it does 
not necessarily mean 'teachers of religion') as an extension of 
Whitehead's notion that the essence of religion is that it be 
religious. I find it hard to visualize education without teachers! 
The point would seem therefore to follow; though A.N.W. has perhaps 
confused the issue. 
5. cf. the prophecy of an engulfing tidal wave in Adelaide, January, 
1976, 'because of its wickedness'. This was a religious comment, 
or judgement. An intellectual problem arises in such circumstances. 
It was made, no doubt, both on good religious criteria, and with 
confidence in a law of causal association. It proved false! 
6. Whitehead, A.N., Religion and Science (reprinted as Ch. XII in 
Science and the Modern World, 1925. 
7. Religion, however, does not work this way. (The trumpet must not 
give an uncertain sound) • The equivocation is noted; but the 
dialectical process is not, as a rule, characteristic of 'religion' -
or, more precisely, of religious behaviour. 
8. Martin, D., The Religious and the Secular, R.K.P., 1969. 
He quotes Bishop Robinson's suggestion that 'structure must be 
stripped' because of the wastage that goes on in the maintenance 
of religious structure; and he shows that this is not possible. 
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Then 'parallel attitudes arise in relation to images and stereo-
types. There is in some a fear of any authoritative image as a 
centre of religious awareness, because as it commands it restricts, 
as it focuses it excludes'. 
9. Macquarrie, J., Twentieth-Century Religious Thought, S.C.M., 1967. 
10. Emmet, D.M., The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, Macmillan, 1944. 
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APPENDIX 
A sununary of the Black Paper Basics; to which I have referred in the 
text as The Ten Points. 
1. Children are not naturally good. 
2. If the non-competitive ethos of progressive education is 
allowed to dominate our schools ---------------- unable to 
maintain our standards of living when opposed by fierce rivalry 
from overseas competitors. 
3. It is the quality of teachers that matters ---------------. 
4. Schools are for schooling, not social engineering. 
5. The best way to help children in deprived areas is to teach 
them to be literate and numerate, and to develop all their 
potential abilities.* 
6. Every normal child should be able to read by the age of 
seven. This can be achieved by the hard work of teachers 
who use a structured approach. 
7. Without selection the clever working-class child in a deprived 
area stands little chance of a real academic education. 
8. External examinations are essential -------------------
such checks standards decline ----------------. 
Without 
9. Freedom of speech must be preserved in universities. 
Institutions which cannot maintain proper standards of open 
debate should be closed. 
10. You can have equality or equality of opportunity; you cannot 
have both. Equality will mean the holding back (or the new 
deprivation) of the brighter children. 
* 'To develop all their potential abilities' forces us to ask 
"For evil, as well as for good?" 
For a discussion of this see p.64/5 of Towards a Compulsory Curriculum 
by J.P. White. 
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